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Lithium-ion battery energy storage systems (Li-BESS) are becoming increas-
ingly popular in consumer devices, electric vehicles, and aircraft along with industrial,
commercial, residential, and utility-scale energy storage applications. Despite the
growth of use cases and applications, wide-spread Li-BESS adoption is being hindered
by safety concerns related to fire and explosion hazards involving these systems. In
the event of thermal runaway, these systems can release flammable gases which can
cause fires or explosions. The fire and explosion hazard associated with these cells
depends on many factors such as the state of charge, cathode chemistry, electrolyte
composition, cell form factor, cell capacity, and failure mode.
Under certain failure conditions, the lithium-ion cells that makeup Li-BESS
can undergo a self-heating process. This process results from a series of exothermic
reactions that can occur inside the cell. These reactions can result in an uncontrolled
release of heat and energy that is commonly referred to as thermal runaway. During
vi
thermal runaway, the battery cells can release flammable gas mixtures. This can lead
to a deflagration scenario which is comparable to flammable gas and combustible
dust hazards. Deflagration vents can be incorporated into systems containing lithium-
ion batteries to minimize and mitigate explosion hazards. Sizing the vents requires
an understanding of the battery vent gas characteristics. There are also unique fire
hazards associated with lithium-ion cells. Compared to other common combustible
commodities, piloted ignition of a lithium-ion cell first results in a violent release
of flammable gases. This is followed by the consumption of the other combustible
components that make up the cell. The overall fire hazard from a Li-BESS depends
on the HRR of the lithium-ion cells, which is dependent on the propagation rate
of cell failures in multi-cell modules. Currently, codes and standards do not have
provisions for designing fire suppression systems for lithium-ion cells or Li-BESS.
One approach to determine the flammability characteristics of lithium-ion cells is by
using oxygen consumption (cone) calorimetry. Understanding these characteristics
will be important inputs for performance-based analysis for both deflagration and
fire safety design.
The goal of this research is to help the various stakeholders within the
safety community develop an awareness of fire and explosion hazards associated
with Li-BESS. This is done by understanding prescribed methods from safety codes
and standards while being able to apply them to this unique hazard. Bench-scale
testing flammability and analysis of gas compositions will be performed to even
further understand and characterize the lithium-ion cells.
vii
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1.1 History of Safety and Emerging Technology
Industrial safety has improved over the last 100 years through the development and
enforcement of industrial codes and standards. In the late 1800s, as hot water boilers
became more popular, safety issues materialized. In the early 1900s boiler explosions
in Massachusetts caused concern among the community. These events eventually led to
the development of the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code from the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) (1). Multiple incidents in Massachusetts occurred before
the safety community reacted and developed the first boiler code. This historical example
shows the need to proactively understand hazards and develop safety guidelines.
Again, in the late 1800s through the mid-1900s, multiple incidents caused community-
wide concerns. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) developed numerous
codes and standard to help combat fire-related incidents. Fires such as the Great Chicago
Fire in 1871, Ohio State Penitentiary Fire in 1930 and the Cocoanut Grove Nightclub
Fire have led to the development of various codes and standards. Increasing safety for
construction materials, life safety codes, and requirement of fire detection and suppression
(2) are examples of the increased level of safety. Yet even with the safety and prevention
techniques such as smoke removal, stairwell pressurization, and fire detection and suppression,
tragic incidents are sometimes the only drivers for communities to adopt and enforce
established codes and standards. In 1980 the MGM Grand casino did not use sprinklers
throughout the casino, even as they became more common at the time. When a fire
erupted, sprinklers would have prevented or slowed the rate of fire spreading throughout the
structure. Without automated notification and suppression systems, mass confusion caused
unnecessary causalities and property destruction. In contrast, a similar fire in 2008 at
the Monte Carlo casino, which did have automated suppression, detection and notification
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systems, had no causalities. The damage was minimal and the resort reopened three weeks
later. This shows that not only do safety systems and requirements need to be established,
but also properly communicated, implemented and inspected (3).
In addition to fire hazards, explosions have caused many tragic incidents. In the late
1800s, a flour plant in Illinois had an explosion that resulted in one causality and multiple
structures being destroyed (4). This resulted in NFPA recognizing combustible dust as
a hazard. As other incidents occurred, a committee (NFPA 68) was formed to develop
standards on explosion protection systems (5). Even with such an early awareness of the
hazard, combustible dust incidents still are present in the 21st century. The Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) creating a Combustible Dust National Emphasis
Program (NEP) in 2007 (6).
As new technologies emerge, the hazards posed by the technology are largely unrecog-
nized until tragic hazards occur. As technologies emerge more quickly and deploy more
broadly, it is important to develop processes to address safety challenges. This approach
can help proactively protect lives, structures, and integrity of emerging technologies.
1.2 Lithium-Ion Battery Energy Storage Systems
The use of lithium-ion cells is rapidly increasing in today’s society. They are used
at the consumer electronics level to transportation systems and even to grid-level energy
storage. At larger fixed-installation sizes, lithium-ion battery energy storage systems are
becoming frequently from residential applications to electrical grid scale. In the design
of these systems, engineers must balance performance, cost, size, packaging and safety
concerns.
2
1.2.1 Basic Lithium-Ion Battery Understanding
Over 25 years ago, Sony Corporation first introduced the consumer rechargeable
lithium-ion battery to the market for use in hand-held electronics. They used lithium cobalt
oxide (LCO) for the cathode chemistry, helping give the ability to bring the concept of a
”rocking chair” or rechargeable battery to the commercial market. The LixCoO2 cathode
was discovered by Dr. John Goodenough in 1980 (7).
The basic principles of a battery can be related to a water tower analogy. The
potential or voltage (V) is based on the overall height of the water tower. The capacity
(Ah) is analogous to the total mass/volume of water that can be held in the water tower.
For a water tower, the total energy is the product of the height and volume of the water
tower. For a battery, the energy is the product of the capacity and potential (Wh). The
power (W) is the rate of energy transfer. Lithium-ion cells consist of a separated anode and
cathode.
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Figure 1.1: Lithium-Ion Battery Charging Schematic
Figure 1.1 above shows the lithium-ion transportation during the charging or dis-
charging process from Bensalah et al. (8). The lithium ions move from the cathode to
the anode upon charging and then when discharging move in the opposite direction. An
electrolyte is introduced into the separator to promote ion transport during charging and
discharging. The charge rate or C-rate is the rate at which the cell can be charged or
discharged. For example, a 1000 mAh cell rated for 1C can be charged at 1000 mA.
Starting from the discharged state, after one hour this cell should be fully charged. Most
manufacturers are conservative on this value to prolong the life of the battery. The State
of Charge (SOC) gives an indication of what the capacity level is at based on the nominal
voltage range the cell is designed for. The State of Health (SOH) is an indication of how
much the cell capacity has faded with respect to a brand-new cell.
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Lithium-ion cells are designed with various form factors, capacities, cathode and
electrolyte chemistries. A cylindrical cell can be compared to a standard AA or AAA cell
in terms of the form. Coin or button cells are similar to a watch battery. Pouch cells are
common in phones and are thin and rectangular in shape. They are constructed with a
soft pouch encasing the anode, cathode, and separator with two tabs sticking out of the
end. Prismatic cells can be compared to car batteries in terms of construction. There are
a large variety of cathode and electrolyte chemistries. Cathode chemistries include lithium
iron phosphate (LFP), lithium cobalt oxide (LCO), lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide
(NMC), lithium manganese oxide (LMO) and lithium nickel cobalt aluminum (NCA). Each
chemistry has various specific energy density (Wh/kg), specific volume (m3/kg), cost, and
application. Additionally, numerous electrolyte chemistries exist, such as ethylene carbonate
(EC), dimethyl carbonate (DMC), ethyl methyl carbonate (EMC), diethyl carbonate (DEC),
propylene carbonate (PC), and methyl propyl carbonate (MPC).
1.2.2 Safety Concerns
With Li-BESS as an emerging technology, different risks and hazards are presented.
This drives the need for analysis to ensure systems are safely integrated at all levels. Energy
storage systems can serve a multitude of different roles and purposes. Grid peak shaving can
be done when the electrical demand on the grid exceeds the supply, energy from the Li-BESS
can be used to compensate. These systems can also be used for establishing a means to
store energy from renewable sources such as wind turbines or solar systems. Additionally,
backup power is another potential use for Li-BESS. Due to the multitude of functions these
systems can have, a greater understanding of how to safely manage them is necessary.
Achieving the desired level of safety is especially important in applications for
military, aircraft, spacecraft and in densely populated environments where a Li-BESS
failure could lead to a high consequence (9). While performance measures are generally
well characterized for battery designers, safety aspects are not well-defined. A catastrophic
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failure can occur due to manufacturing defects, thermal abuse, electrical abuse or mechanical
damage. Although failure rates are frequently measured and found to be very low, the
consequences can be very high, and the fire and explosion hazards must be considered and
understood.
Certain failure modes within lithium-ion cells can lead to an exothermic reaction
within the sealed cell This cell can then go into thermal runaway. In thermal runaway,
reactions increase the overall cell temperature. This builds pressure in the cell and can
ultimately lead to rupture and off-gassing from the cell. During thermal runaway, battery
cells can generate large amounts of flammable gas consisting of hydrogen, carbon monoxide,
and carbon dioxide along with various hydrocarbons such as methane and propane. This
can result directly as either a fire, deflagration or combination of both hazards.
1.2.3 Recent Failure Events
There are many examples of lithium-ion cells entering thermal runaway, causing
fires and explosions. On small-scales, thermal runaway can be seen regularly in failures
of consumer devices such as portable electronics including mobile phones, laptops, and
e-cigarettes. Failures with e-cigarettes have caused them to explode near users face head
and neck area, causing life-threatening injuries (10). Examples of other consumer electronic
incidents are issues with the Samsung Note 7 phone. In 2016 when the phone was plagued
by numerous reports of fires and overheating. It took nearly 100 reported incidents in two
weeks before the US Consumer Product Safety Commission recalled the devices. The issues
were initially diagnosed incorrectly, as a replacement phone that was powered down and
unplugged caught fire on an airplane. The investigation showed that there were batteries
supplied by two different companies, each with their set own issues. One set, from Samsung
SDI, had issues with the tolerance between the battery pouch and the internals of the
phone. This caused the electrodes to crimp and short circuit. The batteries from Amperex
Technology Limited had quality control issues when the insulation tape was missing on
some cells. Additionally, other cells had sharp edges that caused short-circuiting (11).
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Regardless of the issue, minor oversights by a well-known and versatile company such as
Samsung caused major issues that led to a potential aircraft fire. Consumers also reported
burns and injury from the Note 7 cell phone failing. Recently, the computer manufacturer
Hewitt & Packard recalled over 100,000 laptops for fire and burn hazards after eight reports
of melting and charring since January of 2018 (12). This shows even after previous incidents,
new failures still occur.
Larger fires have been reported and investigated within electric automobiles. One
example comes from the 2011 Chevrolet Volt crash testing. After the test was completed,
the vehicle caught fire over the weekend when no lab personnel was present. The Chevrolet
Volt had been involved in a New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) pole test three week
prior to the fire (13). This is an impact test with a solid pole for crash testing ratings.
During the investigation, it was determined the battery was damaged but only over time
did it catch fire. While it was difficult to repeat the failure and fire, this example shows
how dangerous and volatile lithium-ion cells can be. In addition to regular use, disposal
and recycling of lithium-ion cells require safety considerations. Tesla automobiles have had
numerous failures over the past few years. Various incidents range from battery issues caused
by crash damage, issues with charging stations, improperly tightened electrical connections,
and other issues (14). Each fire reported was very difficult for first responders to control
and took hours and up to a whole day to completely extinguish. In some cases, the car
reignited days later after the initial fire was extinguished (15). Recently, a Tesla Model
S caught fire in Shanghai, China. The vehicle was not in use and parked in a monitored
parking garage. Gas started to rapidly vent from the vehicle before igniting causing a large
fireball then the whole car was engulfed in flames (16).
The Federal Aviation Administration will not allow lithium-ion cells to be transported
in aircraft unless installed in consumer electronics at a state of charge of 30% or lower. This
comes after multiple incidents on flights and three aircraft accidents attributed to planes
transporting lithium-ion cells. One of those flights was UPS Airlines flight 6 leaving Dubai
headed for Germany. The plane contained a large quantity of lithium-ion cells and other
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combustibles. A large fire developed, which caused smoke to enter the cockpit. This made
it nearly impossible for the pilots to see their instrument clusters. Additionally, the fire
caused life support systems to malfunction along with structural components within the
plane to fail. This made it difficult to control the plane as the functionality of the systems
failed. Unfortunately, the crash resulted in no survivors. In the causal analysis, the fire
detection methodology was determined to be inadequate due to the delay from the pallet
of cells being covered. This can be read in the report by the FAA (17).
An example of a larger, industrial scale explosion incident is the 2017 train car
explosion in Houston, Texas. The train car explosion was caused by discarded lithium-ion
cells being transported to a recycling facility. The explosion was so violent windows broke
on buildings about 500 feet away (18; 19). Large fire events have also occurred. In 2017, a
containerized lithium-ion ESS burned at a utility plant near Brussels, Belgium. The ESS
in Belgium was equipped with fire detection and suppression which failed to extinguish the
flames (20). In 2018 a cement plant in Jecheon, North Chungcheong Province experienced
over $3 million in damage. This was the 15th reported ESS fire in Korea this year (21).
These different incidents show the consequence of what can happen if safety systems
are not properly designed, installed, commissioned and maintained for devices that use
lithium-ion cells. There are hundreds if not thousands of other reported issues over various
scales from small consumer electronics all the way to complete Li-BESS engineered systems.
Even small scale systems ranging down to consumer electronics can cause incidents and are
a safety hazard. At the SNL 2019 ESS Safety & Reliability Forum, the number of incidents
initially reported as 15, which was disputed for the Korea ESS incidents to be anywhere
from 15 to 40. With no central repository of Li-BESS incidents, it is difficult to have the
facts correct. So, while multiple regions and countries are using the Li-BESS and having
similar failures and incidents, there is no way to keep track and update one another on what
exactly is happening. This shows a large gap that needs to be closed to reduce incidents
and learn from one another. To this day, there are reports of 21 fires occurring in South
Korea per other sources (22). This shows how inconsistent reporting of these incidents is.
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It is also not clear what safety systems are installed in each of these incidents and how they
affected the outcome.
While writing this thesis, a devastating incident occurred in Surprise, Arizona on
April 19th, 2019. A passerby noticed smoke coming from the substation site, who then called
first responders. A Li-BESS caught fire in the substation prompting the fire department
response. A hazmat team was called on site. While trying to investigate the Li-BESS,
an explosion in a substation occurred. Eight firefighters were injured, with four being
transported to the hospital and one in serious condition (23). It has been reported the
explosion caused both chemical skin burns and chemical-inhalation burns (24). A lot
of the personal protection equipment the firefighters were wearing was damaged and/or
ripped off of the firefighters when the explosion occurred. With details still emerging, it
is unclear what the exact cause of this incident is, as numerous investigators are on the
scene (25). Fortunately for everybody, there were no fatalities. This incident comes after a
2012 fire had already occurred in Surprise, Arizona (26). After the 2012 incident, various
safety improvements have been established such as improving ventilation between cabinets,
monitoring of systems and remote alarm capabilities. Even with these improvements, there
was still a safety incident seven years later.
These recent incidents show that even with prior knowledge and understanding
of Li-BESS failures from incidents that have occurred previously, there is still a lack of
understanding and safety of these systems. As meetings, forums, discussions and other
methods to learn and improve the safety of Li-BESS are being coordinated, it is clear there
is a large gap in the technology advancement verse the safety systems. These incidents show
the absolute need to improve and enforce safety systems and methods for Li-BESS right
away.
Based on the incidents, there are clearly two hazards from lithium-ion cells and
Li-BESS. The first is the fire hazard, which requires an understanding of both the fuel
loading and the unique challenge to design and integrate a suppression system into Li-BESS.
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Sizing systems to extinguish a Li-BESS fire is a challenge. If special fire protection systems
are used such as carbon-dioxide or vapor systems, they must be sized for potentially
long-lasting fires and to be fully functional after multiple uses. Explosion hazards need to
be mitigated, as shown by both the Houston train car and the Surprise, Arizona incidents.
Both hazards exist, and if the fire is extinguished and vent gas is still being produced, this
leads to an explosion hazard as flammable gas accumulates. A Li-BESS is a unique hazard
and requires an understanding of both the fire and explosion hazards.
1.3 Contents of Thesis
Lithium-Ion Battery Energy storage systems are becoming much more popular and
widely used, yet its obvious that there is a lot to understand and learn still regarding the
safety analysis. Codes and standards are slowly emerging for this new technology, but they
will need to be revised and updated as studies and awareness increases. Yet as with the
history of codes and standards as previously mentioned, they tend to be slower than the
pace of the technology development. Historically, it takes accidents and/or incidents to
bring awareness to the types of problems these technologies present. Different methods
to help prevent lithium-ion battery-related incidents can be implemented based on both
quantitative and qualitative analysis and understanding. The objective of this thesis is to
help evaluate what might lead to a Li-BESS failure. Additionally, the explosion and fire
hazards will be characterized. By comparing the characteristics with well-known hazards,
existing codes and standards can be modified and used for this upcoming technology.
Chapter two will help cover the failure modes in addition to considerations and
brain-storming of what oversights might lead to failures. Additionally, listings of different
codes and standards relevant to Li-BESS will help understand what already has been done
and what new info/data can be used to mitigate the hazards associated with these systems.
Chapter three will show how to characterize the off-gas composition and compare with
other similar hazards such as flammable gases and combustible dusts. Different models will
estimate the lower flammability limit, laminar flame speed, and maximum overpressure.
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These values will then be compared and used to show how to apply code-based deflagration
vent size calculations from NFPA 68 to an example application. Some of the effects of
obstructions and partial-volume calculations will be performed to further understand how
this prescribed method works. Chapter four will provide insight on the fire hazard associated
with lithium-ion cells. The heat release rate (HRR) and total heat released will be measured
with an oxygen consumption cone calorimeter. The data from this testing can be used to
compare lithium-ion cells with other fire hazards and commodities. Better fire and fuel
load characterization of cells will support the development of sprinkler design guidelines for
lithium-ion cells and Li-BESS. Chapter five will conclude the thesis and help breakdown and
understand what additional work needs to be done to further development of Li-BESS safety.
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Chapter 2
Understanding of Failures and Hazards
Many factors can lead to a catastrophic failure within Li-BESS. Failures can arise
due to a manufacturing defect, inadequate cooling to the battery rack or even at a module
level, overcharging, over-cycling, and other component and/or system defects. By using a
parameter diagram, the inputs and consequence/outputs can be visually explained for the
Li-BESS as seen below:
Figure 2.1: Parameter Diagram for Energy Storage Systems
Through the construction of parameter diagrams shown in figure 2.1, control factors,
and system noises have been established to help the safety community understand how a
Li-BESS operates. These parameter diagrams also show what error states may occur,
giving a baseline of what issues must be addressed. Parameter diagrams are generated to
establish a greater understanding and visual aid of how different systems interact. Safety
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or failure of Li-BESS might evolve from issues involving system ventilation, inspection,
testing and maintenance (ITM) scheduling, system commissioning, cooling systems, battery
management systems and more. The inputs are derived from potential performance-based
requirements such as the capacity, energy density, along with the operating voltage and
current. The application type is important to understand for operations such as peak
shaving or renewable energy since cycling and usage effects the life of the system. Once
these inputs are established, control factors to maintain Li-BESS safety and reliability are
used. Examples of control factors can be engineering packaging and mechanical safety
mechanisms, along with guidance from codes and standards. Different noise factors such
as the environment that the Li-BESS is installed in, the type of usage or over-usage, how
the quality control and commissioning are executed can make a difference on whether the
system operates correctly. If each of these different noise factors is considered and means to
mitigate and prevent them are established, an ideal output with a reliable, safe system will
be the outcome. If proper control factors are not executed, error states and undesired side
effects such as system failure, safety issues, and customer disapproval will result. By using a
recognized approach in the high-level analysis, this should aid in spreading awareness with
familiar and established methods. One of the main issues, as seen in the error states, is a
thermal runaway, which can cause pressure to build in the cell, ultimately rupturing and
off-gassing. This is where fire and explosion hazards develop and must be mitigated.
2.1 Li-BESS Breakdown
Lithium-ion battery energy storage systems are constructed from numerous individual
cells. The following explains the hierarchy of how each component in the Li-BESS is related:
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Figure 2.2: Lithium-Ion Battery Cell
• Battery Cell- the individual battery cell with an anode, cathode, separator material,
and electrolyte. There are multiple geometries such as cylindrical, coin/button, pouch
and prismatic as shown in figure 2.2 above (27).
Figure 2.3: Lithium-Ion Battery Module
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• Module or pack- multiple cells enclosed in either a series, parallel or combination of
series and parallel as shown in figure 2.3 above (28).
Figure 2.4: Lithium-Ion Battery Racks
• Rack- Multiple module/packs enclosed with control systems, battery, and thermal
management systems and connections to make the Li-BESS work properly as shown
in figure 2.4 above (29).
• Battery Management System (BMS)- Control system for an energy storage system.
Controls current and charging/discharging cycles
• Thermal Management System (TMS)- Controls cooling and heating system to ensure
battery cells stay within predetermined set points
2.2 Failure Modes
Failures at the cell level can be summarized by the following list:
• Manufacturing Defects- Inadequate quality control or foreign material introduced
between the cathode and anode causing a short
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• Thermal Abuse- Lack of adequate cooling, failure of the cooling system, and/or
operated or stored outside of manufacturer specified temperature range
• Electrical Abuse- Overcharging/discharging, external short circuit and/or wiring not
sized properly
• Mechanical Abuse- Physical damage to the system from abuse or fatigue or lack of
vibration isolation
There are a significant number of variables that can cause several different failure
modes. Creating fishbone diagrams can help visualize the different layers of issues that
can lead to system failure. They provide a starting point on identifying some effects of
individual systems or processes on the overall system. These fishbone diagrams are based
on discussions within the UTFRG Battery Research Group and are designed to help bring
up potential hazards and issues with Li-BESS.
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Figure 2.5: Overview Fishbone Diagram for Li-BESS
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Figure 2.5 shows the general high-level overview for what can affect a Lithium-ion
battery energy storage system and how each might fail. The six main points of failure
captured are (1) preventative maintenance, (2) lack of safety and prevention systems, (3)
the physical environment the system is installed in, (4) commissioning of the system, (5)
notification of system issues, and (6) overall use or abuse of the system. There are additional
details associated with each of the levels associated with the operation of a Li-BESS, each
which is further covered in the following figures. While these six main components were
identified, there could be others that are not identified in this analysis. The following six
figures will show different lower level issues. With fishbone diagrams, multiple levels of
potential failures can be identified. In this analysis, two levels are identified.
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Figure 2.6: Preventative Maintenance Fishbone Diagram
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Figure 2.6 shows the breakdown of errors that might occur associated with overall
system maintenance. The factors shown associated with preventative maintenance failure
are (1) training, (2) documentation, (3) scheduling, (4) testing, (5) sensor systems and (6)
the state of health. There can be a breakdown in the training of personnel and manufacturer
specific operation methods. Additionally, not having documentation and scheduling can
hinder the ability to proactively prevent failure with Li-BESS. Preventative maintenance
is intended to help prevent failures and unplanned outages or system shutdowns. One
example might be that every year a specific breaker in a Li-BESS must be replaced to
ensure it does not fail during standard operation. Depending on how critical the equipment
is, availability of spare components, and other factors, system maintenance may be as
scheduled needed or using the predictive/preventative algorithm. In some cases, such as
Li-BESS, system failure may lead to a safety incident or hazard. This suggests the need
for a preventative maintenance method in which the system health is monitored to ensure
safe operation. By tracking the state of health, for example, metrics can be established and
monitored to diagnose changes in system health. Indications of such changes can then lead
to scheduling planned outages such as replacement of cells, modules, racks or the whole
system. Measuring temperature changes, any vent gas production or trends in incorrect
charging/discharging rates can help identify early failures in order to maintain system safety
and reliability. Furthermore, testing the SOH, charging and discharging currents, voltages,
and other parameters might be required outside of normal usage depending on how the
system is operated. This might be an annual or semi-annual test that is used to monitor
the whole system and determine what repairs or replacements are required. Additionally,
proper training and documentation are crucial to make sure nothing is overlooked from a
maintenance perspective.
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Figure 2.7: Safety and Preventative Systems Fishbone Diagram
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Figure 2.7 show how lack of different safety components and parameters might
lead to a failure in Li-BESS. The various potential failures of the safety and preventative
systems identified above are (1) ventilation, (2) cooling systems, (3) dust control, (4)
battery management system, (5) detection and (6) separation/exposure. Ventilation and
cooling systems are important to prevent self-heating and thermal runaway. They must
be sized properly in addition to being protected from the elements. Contaminates such
as dust can reduce air flow and is an environmental factor that must be accounted for.
Further discussion on this will be provided below. The battery management system should
identify cooling system issues and initiate fail-safe activities such as system shutdown and
user notification. Fail-safe activities can include reduction of system capacity or shutting
the system down completely. To reduce the capacity, potentially discharging the whole
system would lead to a lower potential consequence if a failure were to occur. The rate of
discharge is important to establish as discharging too fast could heat cells and can actually
cause additional failures. Detection of failures and anomalies is important to feedback
into preventive maintenance trends and help understand the overall SOH of the system.
The data-logging should be controlled and interpreted by the BMS, as it needs to monitor
and control the whole system in the event there are error states. If separation and isolation
systems both mechanically, electrically and thermally are not implemented, one single failure
can quickly propagate throughout the whole system. Exposure due to lack of separation
between cells and/or modules can lead to a complete system failure.
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Figure 2.8: Environmental Impacts Fishbone Diagram
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Figure 2.8 shows the overall effect or potential issues that might be caused by the
surrounding environment of the Li-BESS. Environmental impacts on Li-BESS include (1)
vibrations, (2) seismic, (3) dust, (4) temperature, (5) water and (6) separation. Some of
these have been previously covered, as each fishbone does interconnect at certain levels.
While fire and explosion hazards are considered, other failure protection such as vibration
and seismic damage. With the idea that Li-BESS would be installed in mechanical or
electrical rooms that are not necessarily cooled, heated, cleaned or environmentally friendly
spaces, there are complications that may arise. Vibration from other equipment such as
chillers, fans, compressors, and other large equipment may cause tabs on pouch cells to
become damaged or the pouch itself to wear out. Environmental impacts such as extreme
temperatures or even water may be an issue depending on the quality of construction and
location of the actual Li-BESS. Perhaps the system must be raised such that flooding will
not cause an electrical malfunction or damage the system. Separation from other equipment
might be difficult based on whether it is new or existing space. These issues might lead to
different error states that may take time to arise. Shorting out, thermal runaway or physical
damage can occur if the environment and system are not matched properly.
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Figure 2.9: Commissioning Fishbone Diagram
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Commissioning errors can lead to both long-term and short-term issues and need to
be well understood and executed. Figure 2.9 shows some of the potential errors and issues
that might lead to system failure. The main errors associated with commissioning Li-BESS
is (1) inspection, (2) installation, (3) documentation, (4) construction, (5) manufacturing
quality and (6) renewal/renovation of the existing system. With such a new technology that
many contractors and designers may not be familiar with, documentation and inspection are
crucial to ensure nothing is overlooked. Some literature does exist to provide guidance for
the ESS plan review and inspection process. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratories
and Sandia National Laboratories Energy Storage System Safety: Plan Review and Inspec-
tion Checklist provides a framework for identifying potential issues before they become
an incident (30). Having correct listings, reputable suppliers and manufacturers, along
with inspecting the systems prior to accepting and installing are crucial to ensure a reliable
system. Pre-incident plans and first responder awareness needs to be updated and established
during this process and prior to system operation. This directly ties into the next fishbone
diagram regarding incident prevention and notification. Additionally, with these systems
installed in existing buildings, ensuring both the electrical and building infrastructure need
to be verified to handle Li-BESS. Proper documentation and approval of renovated systems
must be enforced. This ensures safety is not compromised even on existing systems no
matter the level of replacement.
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Figure 2.10: Notification Fishbone Diagram
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Figure 2.10 shows some of the notification and prevention systems that should be in
place to help prevent or catch potential incidents or hazards before they occur. Some of the
main notification issues can come from lack of (1) sensors, (2) immediate area notification,
(3) building wide notification, (4) signage and warnings, (5) pre-incident plan integration
and (6) alarm system integration. Having sensors monitoring temperatures and gas release
and providing feedback into BMS is important in identifying errors in the system. The
time response on these sensors is also important, as minutes or seconds are important when
dealing with potential life safety issues. It is important to have occupant notification in both
the immediate area and building-wide in the event of an accident. Integration of a BMS
that is monitoring the systems with the fire panel can help proactively prevent life safety
issues. Additionally, this can help first responders understand the accident and failures by
reviewing the fire alarm panel. This again goes directly into the documentation as shown
in figure 2.9. Knowing which specific rack in a complete Li-BESS is failing is important for
first responders as they determine what actions to take.
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Figure 2.11: Customer Interactions Fishbone Diagram
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Figure 2.11 is the last fishbone diagram described and shows potential errors and
issues from improper usage. The issues captured are (1) proper electrical equipment, (2)
proper handling, (3) correct replacement or repairs, (4) user/owner training, (5) approval of
system and (6) proper cycling/charging. Once a Li-BESS has been approved, installed and
commissioned the designed safety systems are temporarily fixed. If changes are made to the
Li-BESS, such as components replaced, operational parameters changed, or the environment
and separations not maintained, this could cause an issue that is not accounted for in the
original safety design. By changing the overall operation and purpose, the system may
be cycled incorrectly or over-charged/discharged. When the user or owner has the system
turned over to them, these issues should be explained and understood due to the potential
safety issues surrounding Li-BESS.
2.2.1 Li-BESS Explosion Hazards
This section will compare some of the known hazards of Li-BESS and how they relate
to known industrial hazards. From the known failures, an explosion hazard exists due to
lithium-ion cell failure. This failure can be related to other hazards such as flammable
gas and combustible dust. Explosion hazards are based on inputs from what can be
called the ”explosion pentagon” in which an oxidizer, ignition source, fuel, confinement,
and dispersion need to exist and based on each of those five parameters, an explosion
can occur. Examples of explosion hazards are natural gas plants, hydrogen facilities, gas
transportation through piping systems, evaporating solvents as part of a process or large
chemical spills. Based on the volume of the room and the volume of flammable gas released,
the fuel concentration will vary, and this will change the parameters such as flame speed
and theoretical maximum overpressure. Additionally, combustible dusts are another known
industrial explosion hazard. These range from handling organic grains such as flour, metal
grinding, chemical spraying and processing, pharmaceuticals and woodworking. If dust
is dispersed as a cloud and ignited, based on confinement, the flash fire can result in an
explosion. What should be noted is that while materials such as metals are not a fire hazard
when in a solid form. When these materials are dust or powder of particles of roughly 500
µm in diameter based on the specific material (31), there is a potential explosion hazard.
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While combustible dusts have many different properties compared to flammable gases, the
hazards associated can be related. Understanding well known and researched flammable
gases and combustible dusts will be used to help rank Li-BESS deflagration hazards. This
will be presented in chapter three.
Figure 2.12: Li-BESS Explosion Hazard
Figure 2.12 shows how system design can lead to the generation of a flammable
mixture and an eventual explosion in a Li-BESS system. In the event a failure occurs in
a Li-BESS, vent gases from failing cells can accumulate at the module, rack or room level.
Based on factors such as gas-species, ventilation, concentration, release rates, and total
vent gas volume, a flammable mixture can occur. With initial ignition, a fire may occur
that consumes surrounding oxygen and can lead to under-ventilated fire extinction. More
vent gas is produced from other cells that have failed. Additional ventilation can suddenly
happen, for example by firefighters entering the Li-BESS compartment. If secondary or
delayed ignition occurs, this can cause an explosion.
2.2.2 Li-BESS Fire Hazards
Li-BESS present a unique fire hazard due to the failure modes and propagation
effects. When a lithium-ion cell fails, flammable gases are usually ejected. These gases can
remain unburned or might be ignited and burned as a jet-flame. This jet-flame from one
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cell in a Li-BESS can heat other cells, converting the potential chemical energy rapidly into
thermal energy. With fuel and heat provided by the failed cells, if there is enough oxygen
present, a fire hazard will exist. Based on ventilation rates, and whether the Li-BESS
is well vented or in a sealed environment, will determine if a fire scenario or explosion
scenario will exist. Not only is there the hazard of the flammable gases, but also the various
materials used to construct the actual cells add to the fuel load. Cells are constructed using
various plastics such as nylon and polypropylene. Additionally, a hazard exists regarding
extinguishing strategies. Class C fire extinguishers are used for electrical fires yet using
water directly on the cells can help cool down and prevent reignition and slow propagation
of failure throughout cells (32). How to treat lithium-ion cells as an overall commodity is
still unclear. There is a lack of overall guidance for this unique hazard as a commodity and
when used in Li-BESS.
2.3 Relevant Codes & Standards
This section will review some of the relevant codes and standards regarding lithium
battery energy storage systems. Some of the standards are mentioned in the Codes 101
document from PNNL/SNL (33). A lot of safety groups are depending on the upcoming
NFPA 855 to enforce the safety of Li-BESS. Yet this code has yet to be published, and users
will need to be aware of other codes and standards, such as NFPA 13, NFPA 68, NFPA
69, NFPA 70, ASHRAE 21 and appropriate UL standards. The intent of this section is to
review the different hazards along with codes and standards associated with mitigating or
preventing those hazards while giving some insight on certain gaps or issues that should be
addressed.
National Fire Protection Agency Codes and Standards:
• NFPA 1 Fire Code- Ch. 52 Energy Storage Systems (34)
• NFPA 13 Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems (35)
• NFPA 68 Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting (36)
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• NFPA 69 Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems (37)
• NFPA 70 National Electrical Code (38)
• NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code (39)
• NFPA 1620 Standard for Pre-Incident Planning (40)
• NFPA 855 Standard for the Installation of Stationary Energy Storage Systems
(In-Progress as of Spring 2019) (41)
• NFPA 5000 Building Construction and Safety Code (42)
International Code Council:
• International Fire Code (43)
• International Building Code (44)
Underwriters Lab Standards:
• UL 489 Molded-Case Circuit Breakers, Molded-Case Switches, and Circuit-Breaker
Enclosures (45)
• UL 810A Standard for Electrochemical Capacitors (46)
• UL 1642 Standard for Lithium Batteries (47)
• UL 1741 Standard for Inverters, Converters, Controllers and Interconnection System
Equipment for Use With Distributed Energy Resources (48)
• UL 1973 Standard for Batteries for Use in Stationary, Vehicle Auxiliary Power and
Light Electric Rail (LER) Applications (49)
• UL 9540 Standard for Energy Storage Systems and Equipment (50)
• UL 9540A Test Method for Evaluating Thermal Runaway Fire Propagation in Battery
Energy Storage Systems (51)
International Electrical and Electronics Engineers:
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• National Electrical Safety Code (52)
• IEEE 1375-2003 Guide for the Protection of Stationary Battery Systems (53)
• IEEE 1547-2018 - IEEE Standard for Interconnection and Interoperability of
Distributed Energy Resources with Associated Electric Power Systems Interfaces (54)
• IEEE 1679.1-2017 - IEEE Guide for the Characterization and Evaluation of Lithium-
Based Batteries in Stationary Applications (55)
• IEEE 1635-2012/ASHRAE Guideline 21 Guide for the Ventilation and
Thermal Management of Batteries for Stationary Applications (56)
Unified Facilities Criteria:
• UFC 3-520-05 Stationary Battery Areas (57)
The various codes and standards are slowly being updated and used for guidance
on Li-BESS installations and safety. Different authorities adopt and use different codes or
standards. For example, one area of jurisdiction might adopt IFC whereas the other adopted
NFPA 1. At this point, using both and meeting the minimum requirements might be the
best idea as the various codes are updated on different time intervals. NFPA 1 Fire Code
Ch. 52 Energy Storage Systems uses a lot of the verbiage that will be used in the upcoming
NFPA 855 Standard for the Installation of Stationary Energy Storage Systems. The most
interesting point that should be made is in table 52.3.2.2.1 which mentions Maximum
Allowable Quantities (MAQ) of 600 kWh. This is the nominal combined capacity of all
systems in space. If the systems in a Control Area exceeds 600 kWh, the area shall meet
High Hazard classification requirements per NFPA 101 Life Safety Code. A control area is
defined as ”a space bounded by exterior walls, firewalls, fire barriers, horizontal assemblies,
roofs or a combination of these”. The term Maximum Allowable Quantity defines the
quantity of something allowed in each control area. At different floor levels, the MAQ and
number of control areas change. At grade, there are four allowed control areas. Level 2
allows three control areas at 75% of the MAQ, level 3 allows two control areas at 50% of the
MAQ, levels 4-6 allow 12.5% of the MAQ at two control areas, with levels 7-9 also having
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two control areas at 5% of the MAQ. Above 9 floors, the MAQ is 5% per floor level with
one control area. Below grade, the MAQ and number of control areas drop at same as going
above grade, but below two floors no control areas or hazardous materials are permitted.
Now with a MAQ of 600 kWh in table 52.3.2.2.1 of NFPA 1, the question can be raised as
to whether the design and number of control areas apply to table 52.3.2.2.1. With the MAQ
mainly slated towards hazardous materials, which are defined as ”A chemical or substance
that is classified as a physical hazard material or a health hazard material, whether the
chemical or substance is in usable or waste condition”. Whether or not lithium-ion cells are
considered hazardous material or not is to be interpreted by the AHJ, but some clarification
on how the 600 kWh MAQ should be used. Perhaps this MAQ table should be adjusted to
take the type and quantity of electrolyte into account as a hazardous material as discussed
by Wang et al. (58). To reduce the classification of the space, Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis (FMEA) and another hazard mitigation is required by the AHJ per 52.3.2.4 of
NFPA 1.
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Figure 2.13: Roadmap for Upcoming Technology Safety: Li-BESS
Figure 2.13 shows a visual roadmap of how Li-BESS hazards can be analyzed and
what the main hazards and general applicable codes and standards are. The general layout
can be applied to other new technologies. As society increases dependence on Li-BESS,
incidents occur at various levels. With these incidents, political pressure from the safety
community, as well as users/owners, increases to create safe systems. Various computational
and experimental methods can be used to further develop and characterize the hazards. The
four main hazards identified are fire, explosion, toxicity and electrical safety issues. The
main codes identified are NFPA 13, NFPA 68, NFPA 69, IEEE 1635/ASHRAE 21, NFPA
36
72 and NFPA 70. The focus of this thesis is explosion and fire safety, but a general overview
of the electrical and toxicity hazards will be provided in this section.
NFPA 68 Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting and NFPA 69
Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems are standards to design and install both active
and passive deflagration and explosion safety systems. Industry uses safety standards to
control deflagration hazards prescribed in NFPA 68 Standard on Explosion Protection by
Deflagration Venting and NFPA 69 Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems. NFPA 68
is used to size deflagration vents. Deflagration vents are a passive pressure relief system that
is sized to release the overpressure of a deflagration while keeping the structural integrity
of the structure in place. NFPA 69 focuses on active systems such as oxidant reduction,
combustible reaction reduction, controlling ignition sources, and isolation methods. Oxidant
reduction will reduce the level of oxygen by adding an inert gas to purge the environment
so that a fire or explosion cannot occur. Reducing the combustible concentration is done
by ensuring the gas concentration of flammable gas is never to reach the lower flammability
limit. This is can be done through ventilation or dilution. Detection of gases can be used
to shut down specific ignition sources in a space that may trigger an explosion. Passive and
active methods to isolate explosions such as active chemical barriers and actuated valves
or with diverters and flame arrestors. In some cases, one standard or method compared
to the other might be the better choice. Some scenarios may require either a combination
of both or performance-based solutions. Yet with Li-BESS it should be noted methods
prescribed in NFPA 69 are difficult if not impossible. One example is controlling ignition
sources. When lithium-ion cells thermally runaway and fail, they self-heat and this failure
can lead to high temperatures. With this elevated temperature, there’s a higher probability
of ignition occurring and no method to prevent it. Application of NFPA 68 vent sizing will
be discussed in chapter three.
NFPA 13 Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems is used for the minimum
design and installation of sprinkler systems and NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling
Code specifies the design, installation, and maintenance of fire alarm systems. It is interesting
37
neither NFPA 13 or 72 provide specifications for lithium-ion cells. NFPA 13 specifically
notes omitting lithium-ion and other cells with combustible electrolytes. NFPA 72 also
does not have any specific designs or guidance for smoke or heat detection locations for
Li-BESS. Performance-based designs would be required for both fire alarm and sprinkler
systems. With lithium-ion cells enclosed inside of modules which are enclosed inside of
racks, it is difficult to get water directly on the actual cells.
FM Global has conducted tests to evaluate the bulk storage of lithium-ion cells
of different construction types and packaging configurations (59). The testing was with
a reduced commodity due to the extensive cost of large quantities of lithium-ion cells
and was intended to show the effects of stored lithium-ion cell fires. Since sprinkler and
suppression guidance is not provided in NFPA 13, the FM Global testing was intended to
give recommendations on how to approach sizing sprinklers with known commodities. This
test helped understand and compare lithium-ion cells with other large scale fire hazards.
UL 9540A testing also takes into account sprinkler testing only if installation testing is
done. Yet the specifications of the sprinkler system are required from the client to perform
the test. Chapter four will provide more information on NFPA 13, and how to characterize
the fire hazard of lithium-ion cells through bench-scale testing.
IEEE 1635-2012/ASHRAE Guideline 21 Guide for the Ventilation and Thermal
Management of Batteries for Stationary Applications is intended to provide information
and a guide for designing ventilation and thermal management for BESS. As described in
section 2.2.1, both the composition and volume of gases can be dangerous because they
are flammable. ASHRAE 21 was last updated in 2012 and does not have guidelines for
lithium-ion cells. With further knowledge of the species and volume of the flammable gas
mixtures that can be vented from Li-BESS, this standard should be updated accordingly
regarding proper ventilation standards. In continuous use or controlled with a gas detection
system, NFPA 1 52.3.2.8 requires 1 ft3/min/ft2 or 5.1 L/sec/m2. But in the event of
emergency venting during Li-BESS failure, based on the volume and rate of gas vented and
the composition, this may not be enough to prevent the lower flammability limit from being
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reached. Chapter three will discuss the LFL and explosion scenarios in more detail.
Additionally, if the water is used to suppress a Li-BESS fire, there is a potential
for toxic chemicals from the decomposition of the cells to get into the run-off water.
Campion et al. (60) discusses how at elevated temperatures, the electrolyte produces toxic
compounds. Campion reported alkyl fluorides and the fluorinated phosphorous compounds,
alkyldifluoro- phosphate and dialkylfluorophosphate during the thermal decomposition.
Additionally, Hammami et al. (61) reported toxic alkylfluoroethers from the electrolyte
and cathode reacting. Ribiere et al. (62) determined the total amount of hydrogen fluoride,
carbon dioxide, nitric oxide, sulfur dioxide, and hydrogen chloride. By determining the
total amount of toxic gases produced, the time to different toxicity limits was determined
as a function of the total battery system capacity. These studies show there is a need
to understand the quantity of these toxic compounds and how they can be collected and
properly disposed of in the event a suppression system capturing these toxic chemicals.
NFPA 70 National Electrical Code Article 706 gives requirements for energy storage
systems. Along with citing numerous IEEE standards that were listed above, it gives
guidelines for electrical disconnection methods, circuit sizes, over-current protection, inter-
connections and installation of ESS. While the electrical disconnects are required to be
within sight of the ESS or out of sight if it is capable of being locked open, it could be
argued the latter is safer for emergency response. NFPA published a one-page emergency
response reference guide for first responders (63). The first step when assessing the scene
of a BESS fire is to locate emergency stops and the location of the battery room. Also
understanding the type of battery rack and the safety data sheet (SDS) is also suggested.
The SDS will specify the occupational health and safety concerns related to exposure to the
chemical mixtures associated with lithium-ion cells. The second step is to shut down the
equipment if there is a fire or life safety issue. The third step is to monitor for toxic and
flammable gas build up along with the BESS with thermal imaging cameras and ventilating
as needed. The critical issue with this method comes when the BESS must be deactivated.
This means without a remote disconnect, exposure to the system might occur. This is a
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safety concern and perhaps a requirement in both NFPA 70 and the evolving NFPA 855
standard specify or require a remote disconnect feature to minimize exposure to toxic and
flammable gases.
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Figure 2.14: Li-BESS Double V-Diagram
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V-Diagrams or V-Models are intended to help visualize the development of a product
or system (64). Figure 2.14 shows a double V-Diagram that shows the steps to both design
the system and deploy safety testing or modeling at all levels. This helps understand
both the system design and safety integration while also what levels need testing and what
documentation needs to be completed. The design and construction timeline help visualize
the higher-level steps to go from concept to final commissioned product. The scope of work
or SOW is defined based on the customer’s expectations and requirements. From there, an
understanding of what works and what specific systems can be derived from the systems
requirement document (SRD). Using the various codes and standards, the system safety
requirements can be listed in parallel with the Li-BESS requirements. Bench-scale and
other testing or models can be used to validate the safety and performance of the cells,
module and rack designs and the safety requirements of each can be verified. In addition,
once the system is fully defined and specified, documentation of this can be added to the
safety plans. The authority having jurisdiction (AHJ), architect and engineering firm or
consultant (A&E) and the fire department inspectors can commission and approve the
installation and safety features after installation. Once these steps have been completed,
the system can be turned over to the customer. Lessons learned and what unique challenges
were addressed can be documented to help improve future safety and streamline the design
process in future applications.
UL9540A can be tied into figure 2.14, as it provides testing standards at a cell,
module, unit, and installation level. The cell level testing is intended for understanding
the characteristics of the cell design and how it fails and goes into thermal runaway.
Understanding the species of the cell vent gas and lower flammability limit contributes
directly to NFPA 1 Ch. 52 with respect to the gas concentration cannot hit 25% of LFL.
Additionally, this contributes directly to understanding if there is an explosion hazard and
how to compute laminar flame speeds, theoretical maximum overpressures and implement
NFPA 68 to size deflagration vents. The next level of testing is the module design in
UL 9540A. This test provides characteristics of a burning module. The heat release rate
and observations of the test are recorded. The fire load and fire characteristics provide
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necessary data for designing sprinkler and suppression systems especially since NFPA 13
has no lithium-ion cell design information. The unit level test gives a large scope and
provides not only the whole unit heat release rate and gas generation data but also the heat
flux and target wall temperatures. This data again can provide a means to help further
understand the fuel load of a complete system. Additionally, how to separate Li-BESS from
other combustibles, what materials and fire ratings that nearby walls and barriers must
have can be derived from this test. The full test including fire mitigation helps understand
the functionality and effectiveness of the fire and safety mitigation systems. Each level of
the UL9540A testing is captured in the V-diagram at the cell, module, rack, and system
level. With code requirements and known hazards, a starting point to help understand both
qualitatively and quantitatively how to design safety systems for Li-BESS, figure 2.14 helps
visualize the process. This can also be used for other technologies and applied as needed




The intent of this chapter is to present and evaluate models that can be used to
determine critical inputs for the analysis of fire and explosion hazard consequences. As
discussed in section 2.3, Li-BESS presents a potential explosion hazard. This section
describes three metrics that are key to understanding the significance of an explosion:
lower flammability limit, flame speed, and maximum overpressure. These metrics are key
inputs into the analysis of explosion consequences. In thermal runaway, reactions increase
cell temperature, build pressure in the cell, and can ultimately lead to off-gassing due to
a rupture in the cell. During thermal runaway, battery cells can generate large amounts
of flammable gas consisting of hydrogen, carbon monoxide, and carbon dioxide along with
various hydrocarbons such as methane and propane. The vent gas composition break down
will be provided in the literature review.
The lower flammability limit (LFL) is used to determine the volume fraction at
which an explosion and fire hazard exists. The laminar flame speed is the speed at which
the flame propagates relative to unburned fuel mixture. This measurement is important for
understanding the explosion potential and the vent area needed to mitigate an explosion
event. The maximum constant volume adiabatic pressure is used to characterize the
worst-case explosion event in which the explosion is completely confined. In addition,
the various metrics can be used to help rank and compare with already known deflagration
hazards such as combustible dust and flammable gases. By using NFPA 68 to size deflagration
vents for different explosion hazards, this can help take into account all of the different
metrics and rank the Li-BESS explosion hazard and safety requirements.
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3.1 Vent Gas Literature Review
Many experiments have been performed to characterize the vent gas from lithium-ion
cells in thermal runaway. These experiments record the compositions for cells with different
chemistries at varying states-of-charge (SOC’s). The cathode chemistries that have been
analyzed are lithium-cobalt oxide (LCO), lithium-manganese-cobalt oxide (NMC), lithium-
iron-phosphate (LFP) and lithium-nickel-cobalt-aluminum oxide (NCA). The results of the
said review are summarized in table 3.1 below:
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The intent of table 3.1 is to show the various cell failures tests, types of cells and
electrolyte compositions. While a comparison of the vent gas compositions is by SOC and
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cathode chemistry, it is important to understand these parameters. If the authors did not
provide the failure environment specifically, it was noted as N/P. For tests that involved open
flames or cone calorimetry, it was inferred that failure occurred in the air. If a failure occurs
in a non-inert environment, the reported vent gas composition will be slightly different due
to some reactions taking place with the surrounding atmosphere. The vent gas composition
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Figure 3.1: Battery Vent Gas Species Compositions from Literature
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Figure 3.1 shows all the species composition from the reviewed literature by volume
fraction. This review gives only the composition break down and not the total volume
released. Many of the failure tests are through thermal abuse using, for example, ARC
(Accelerating Rate Calorimetry) testing. In 2014, Somandepalli et al. (71) used a heating
wire to cause cells to thermally runaway and vent gas. This was done in a sealed test
chamber filled with argon. The vent gas composition of the LCO cells showed that as the
SOC increases, the volume fraction of carbon-monoxide increases with the carbon-dioxide
and hydrocarbons decreasing. Golubkov et al. (72; 77) performed failure tests similar
to Somandepalli in both 2014 and 2015. Golubkov at al. used a variety of cathode
chemistries and varied the SOC in both papers. Heaters were used to fail the cells in
inert environments. The tests showed for NCA cells that for SOC greater than 75%, the
volume fraction of carbon-dioxide decreases significantly; hydrogen takes up about 25%
volume and carbon-monoxide takes up a significant fraction of the NCA vent gas volume.
When looking at the 2014 study by Golubkov et al., the cathode chemistry varied between
LCO/NMC, NMC, and LFP. These three cathode chemistries at 100% SOC showed nearly
constant volume fraction of hydrogen, but a decrease in carbon-dioxide when comparing the
LCO/NMC and NMC with the LFP chemistry. An FAA study by Maloney et al. (80) was
performed in 2016 at 10 psia in an inert environment to characterize the effects of varying
SOC on vent gas composition. Using LCO cells, they found that as the SOC increases, the
volume fraction of carbon-dioxide decreases. Additionally, Somandepalli measured the lower
flammability limit by determining at what concentration value for the maximum pressure
could be measured. In 2017, Lammer et al. (81) reported that 18650 cells from different
manufacturers with the same cathode chemistry produce different vent gas compositions.
They attributed these differences to different manufacturing techniques and environments
affecting cell chemistry.
In the reviewed literature, overcharge testing was not as common. The first over-
charged test reviewed was in 1999 with Kumai et al. (65), in which an LCO 18650 cell was
cycled by over-charging and over-discharging until failure in a vacuum-tight vessel. The
main components of the vent gas composition for the over-discharged cell were carbon-
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monoxide, and methane. Again in 2005, Ohaski et al. (66) overcharged a prismatic LCO
battery at a rate of 1 C until failure occurred and measured the vent gas composition. This
was done by collecting the vent gas and analyzing it with gas chromatography. The next
over-charged test reviewed was in 2015 by Yuan et al. (76). They overcharged prismatic
LFP cells at high states of charge. The vent gas composition is reported to have anywhere
from 5% to 18% air, which was normalized out in Figure 3.1 below. The testing by Zheng
et al. (79) in 2016 specifies the vent gas composition for an over-discharged LFP pouch cell.
These pouch cells were cycled multiple times from nominally 0% to nominally 100% SOC
and the capacity loss was measured along with observations of physical degradation of the
pouch cells. The final over-charged testing that was reviewed was in 2018 by Fernandes et
al. (83). This overcharge test was performed on cylindrical LFP cells at 190% SOC and the
vent gas composition consisted of carbon-dioxide, hydrogen, and hydrocarbons. Looking at
each composition break-down in Figure 3.1, a noticeable difference is the fact that Kumai
showed that LCO cells at a SOC of 0% have a very high amount of carbon dioxide compared
to other overcharge tests. Yet Zheng showed a large amount of hydrogen and hydrocarbons
with a test on an LFP cell. The data from Yuan and Kumai were not used in the models in
section 3.0 because there was no hydrogen reported. For the Fernandes test having the same
cathode chemistry and SOC as Yuan, hydrogen accounted for about 25% of the volume of
the vent gas composition. Fernandes also brought up this variation when reviewing Yuan’s
work. Kumai specifically states that hydrogen was not measured or reported yet in other
similar electrolyte systems it is.
The overall trends from the literature review of the vent gas compositions can be seen
in Figure 4.1. For each cell chemistry, the general trend is that as the SOC increases, the
amount of hydrogen, carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon fraction increases as the amount of
carbon-dioxide production decreases. The LCO cells have about 25% to 30% carbon-dioxide
by volume at 100% SOC while the LFP cells have about 30% to 40% at 100% SOC. The
NCA cells have the least amount of carbon dioxide, at about 10% to 25% and upwards of
40% hydrogen by volume.
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While the species composition is used to characterize the vent-gas from lithium-ion
cells, the total volume of vent gas is also important to understand. The UTFRG Battery
Group has performed experiments to determine how the total vent gas volume is affected
by the total energy storage capacity. These values were compared with data from the FAA
Report (80) and Somandepalli et al. (71):























Figure 3.2: Volume Production vs. Capacity
Figure 3.2 shows how the total gas volume scales with the total energy capacity in
Wh. The overall trend is linear and gives a value of about 0.46 L/Wh. The largest array
size tested is 370 Wh. An array of five 10 Ah cells and two sets of arrays with ten 5 Ah
cells were tested, giving similar volume releases. This volume production result is a starting
point to help understand the gas production from failed lithium-ion cells. Since a lot of
reported volumes are for single cells, using array testing further contributes to a real-world
application to help understand what the explosion hazard might be during a failure.
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3.2 Gas Mixture Models
The following subsections will give a detailed understanding of the models used to
provide an understanding of the different hazards of the various battery cell chemistries and
states of charge and how the results vary based on failure tests. Cantera was used as the
tool to compute the lower flammability limit, laminar flame speeds, adiabatic temperatures,
and maximum overpressure. With these metrics computed, decisions and designs of safety
systems for explosion protection can be established for Li-BESS.
Cantera is an open source chemical kinetics program that runs through Python,
MATLAB, Fortran or C++ (84). The program has a one-dimensional flame function
that allows freely-propagating premixed laminar flames to be analyzed. Other similar
functions include burner-stabilized flames and counterflow diffusion flames. Each model
is steady-state and quasi-1D. A multitude of inputs is utilized with conservation equations
such as energy and species balancing equations. Other programs such as Chemkin by Ansys
were considered, but Cantera was selected as its open source nature enables broader use.
To start using Cantera, the volume fractions of each species in the fuel and air compositions
are defined. The mixture of fuel and air can be adjusted by altering the equivalence
ratio. Transport data and molecular properties for gas species used in Cantera comes
from GRI-Mech.
GRI-Mech was a sponsored study by the Gas Research Institute (GRI) through
computations and experiments at the University of California at Berkley, Stanford University,
the University of Texas at Austin and SRI International. Using GRI-Mech, accurate
chemical reactions can be modeled for natural gas flames (85). Some of the different
parameters in GRI-Mech include elementary chemical reaction rates, transport coefficients,
molar heat capacity, entropy, and standard enthalpy. The data are open-source but are
about twenty years old and are no longer updated and supported. Due to the nature of
the program and the overall goal, many of the species from the hydrocarbons measured
by researchers in the literature review for the battery vent gas composition measured were
not included in GRI-Mech. Taking this into account, many of the species were binned and
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the volume fraction of those species was added to propane. The binned species consist of
hydrocarbons, CxHy, with a value for x of three or greater. With the larger molecular mass,
propane is the most similar species to the ones not in Cantera. With most of the vent gas
compositions obtained from available literature having less than 10% of the gas by volume
being binned into propane, it did not have a large effect on the overall flame speed. A
sensitivity study was performed by binning the volume fraction into propane compared to
methane and the results are further discussed in section 3.2.3.
3.2.1 Lower Flammability Limit
The first metric to establish is estimating the range of lower flammability limits
(LFL) for different cathode chemistries. The LFL is important for fire and explosion analysis
because it defines the volume fraction of fuel required to create the potential for a fire or
explosion. Different codes, standards, and practices have specific requirements regarding
LFL. This is the main motivation behind understanding and investigating LFL further.
One example is NFPA 1 Ch. 52 states that ventilation is required to keep the flammable
gas concentration limited to 25% of LFL otherwise a ventilation rate of 1 CFM/ft2 (5.1
L/sec/m2) must be maintained or activated with gas detection.
Different methods to estimate the LFL for the battery vent gas compositions has
been performed in literature. Somandepalli et al. (71) determined LFL experimentally using
a combustion vessel and noting the fuel concentration at which the maximum overpressure
was greater than atmospheric pressure. The FAA study (80) used Le Chatelier’s mixing rule
(86) given in equation 3.1, which gives the lower flammability limit of the mixture based on









Using Le Chatelier’s Law to compute the LFL of each cathode chemistry at 100%
SOC gives various ranges based on the cathode chemistry: LCO ranging from 6.5% to 7.5%,
the LFP ranging from 8.3% to 8.7% and NCA cells ranging from 6.2% to 9.8%. The NCA
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cells have such a larger range for LFL due to the various sets of data at 100% SOC with
different failure tests.
Le Chatelier’s law is mainly intended for only hydrocarbons and may not be appropri-
ate for battery vent gas. This is due to the large amount of hydrogen and carbon-monoxide
as well as inert diluent carbon-dioxide. Another method to determine LFL for an air-fuel-
diluent mixture is to calculate the critical adiabatic flame temperature (CAFT). This
method is appropriate for mixtures which contain inert diluents such as carbon-dioxide
(87) as seen in equation 3.2.
XL(T u) =
c̃p,u(1573K − T u)
4hc
(3.2)
This method has an error when applied to the battery vent gas due to hydrogen
having an adiabatic flame temperature at LFL a lot lower than 1573. The study by
Zlochower et al. (88) shows the theoretical adiabatic flame temperature for hydrocarbons
such as ethylene and methane range from 1390 to 1484 K at LFL. Hydrogen has a theoretical
adiabatic flame temperature of approximately 734 K at LFL from Le et al. (89). Other
methods such as Beyler’s Method and the method described by Ma et al. (90) also have
a limitation in predicting LFL for gas mixtures involving hydrogen, hydrocarbons, and
diluents.
The EPA has a paper prepared by the U.S. EPA OAQPS regarding designing and
operating flares (91) that is currently in peer-review. The intent of this paper is to help
understand the performance of flares used in various industrial applications. Table G.5 in
the paper provides experimentally measured LFL values for mixtures of hydrogen, methane,
nitrogen, and carbon-dioxide compared to computed results. Jones et al. (92) use tables
of flammability limits for carbon-monoxide, methane, and hydrogen in carbon-dioxide to
develop a method to determine the mixture LFL with Le Chatelier’s method. These tables
were developed through multiple tests by pulling measured gas volume into an explosion
tube. From there gas mixture was set to atmospheric pressure and as the tube was opened,
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the mixture was exposed to a flame. By adjusting the volume of the gas mixture to
the amount of air in the tube, the flammability limits were determined. From there, the
tables were developed and used to determine the LFL of various flammable gas and diluent
mixtures.
The first step for applying this method is to split inert gas into different binned
groups and combining a specified quantity with each individual combustible gas species.
The developed tables by Jones give the LFL of each new gas mixture based on the ratio
of combustible to inert gas. For example, if there was a mixture with 50% carbon-dioxide,
30% hydrogen and 20% methane, carbon-dioxide can be split in half and each half combined
with the hydrogen and methane. This would give flammable gas to inert gas ratios of 1.2
for the hydrogen and carbon-dioxide mix and 0.8 for the methane and carbon-dioxide mix.
The LFL for these flammable gas to inert gas ratios can be looked up in tables provided by
Jones. The next step is to input those values into Le Chatelier’s equation 3.1, to determine
the LFL. The LFL for the binned mixtures is 9.0% for the hydrogen and carbon-dioxide mix
at 55% volume percent and 10.0% for the methane and carbon-dioxide mix at 45% volume
percent. This gives a mixture of LFL of 9.4% when using 3.1. How the diluent is split
according to Jones does make a difference. Using the example with 50% carbon-dioxide,
30% hydrogen and 20% methane, the percent volume of carbon-dioxide can be split and
binned to equal 30% and 20%. Combining the 30% volume percent with hydrogen and 20%
volume percent with methane gives and LFL of 9.8%. This is 0.4% higher than the previous
binning method.
To use the method by Jones for the lithium-ion cells, it should be noted that the
hydrocarbons will be binned into methane. The tables used by Jones do not include other
hydrocarbons. While there is some uncertainty in using this method since splitting of the
diluent to combine with the combustible gas can be varied, it is used to rank or understand
how flammability limit varies for each cathode chemistry. With most codes and standards
requiring the space to not allow the gas concentration to reach 25% of LFL, this safety factor
will help mitigate uncertainties. The paper flare paper by the EPA shows a less than 10%
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error compared with experimental results. It is also shown that as the hydrogen amount is
lower compared to the total combustibles, roughly 33% or less, the predicted LFL is higher
than the actual LFL. This is due to the enhancement in combustion from hydrogen. Most
of the vent gas compositions at 100% SOC have a combustible gas composition of 35% to
50% hydrogen.
The study by Bounaceur et al. (93) in 2017 furthers the understanding of approaches
on predicting the lower flammability limit for gas mixtures with inert gases. Through
this study, a step-by-step method is provided by using a modified version of the CAFT
method. The adiabatic flame temperature in this study was computed using Chemkin II
which is a similar program to Cantera. According to Bounaceur, hydrogen has an adiabatic
temperature criterion of 629 K compared to 1417 K to 1706 K for carbon dioxide and
multiple hydrocarbons. The study shows a summation of the adiabatic temperatures, calling





Where 3.3 is the summation of the adiabatic flame temperatures, TL,blend, scaled
by the mole fraction of fuel, αi. According to Bounaceur, the method has an uncertainty
of about 15 K. By estimating the blended adiabatic temperature in addition to using the
CAFT method, an additional method to estimating the LFL of inert, hydrogen, carbon
monoxide and hydrocarbons have been established.
Additional work from studies such as the thesis by Terpstra et al. (94) in 2012 or
the dissertation by Hai Le et al. (89) in 2013 show that even with research nearly 100 years
ago there is still a gap in the overall understanding of lower flammability limit estimations.
With the safety community relying on models to predict behaviors such as laminar flame
speed, adiabatic flame temperature and maximum-overpressure, models for estimating the
lower flammability limit should be further studied to reduce reliance on testing.
54
Table 3.2: EPA Gas Mixtures
Mixture 1 Mixture 2 Mixture 3
Carbon Dioxide 60.6 68.4 69.8
Methane 29.0 21.1 15.1
Hydrogen 10.4 10.5 15.1
The three different mixtures used in this comparison are referred to in the EPA
Flares report in table G.5 (91) are provided in table 3.2 above.
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CAFT 17.9 26.3 CAFT 24.3 34.4 CAFT 29.4 44.2
Jones 12.7 3.9 Jones 15.9 0.2 Jones 16.1 1.9
Bounaceur’s 12.6 4.8 Bounaceur’s 15.7 1.5 Bounaceur’s 16 2.6
Table 3.3 compares the various methods described to calculate the lower flammability
limit in percent volume comparing the various gas mixtures from table 3.2. It is clear by
using the method provided by Jones to use a modified gas mixture prior to inputting the
LFL values into equation 3.1 based takes into account the diluents. This shows with a very
small percent error between the experimental data. The method by Jones has an error of
less than 5% while Le Chatelier’s is much higher near 10%. One issue with the method by
Jones is the fact that the binned compositions are up to the user. In this case, the diluent
was binned equally with each flammable gas. How the user completes this binning will
influence the outcome and uncertainty. Yet this method shows results that are very close
to experimental data, as seen in the EPA flare paper and table 3.3 above. Also, the method
by Jones is simple compared with some other methodologies and can be performed with
spreadsheets.
As discussed previously, using the constant adiabatic flame temperature method has
a high error due to hydrogen having a lower flame temperature compared to hydrocarbons.
This is validated, as the error using the CAFT method is 26% to 44%. The method by
Bounaceur using the adiabatic mixing of the fuels gives results very similar to Jones. The
error with this method is just slightly higher than Jones and compared to the CAFT method
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it takes into account the hydrogen issues by scaling the adiabatic flame temperature. Both
Jones and Bounaceur use modified versions of the known LFL computations in order to
account for inert diluents and mixing hydrogen with hydrocarbons and carbon-dioxide.
The methods reviewed show two well-known methods to estimate lower flammability
limit: Le Chatelier’s Law and CAFT. While both methods have low uncertainty in specific
applications, the battery vent gas includes hydrocarbons, hydrogen, carbon monoxide, and
inert diluents. Modified versions of these methods were used to validate with experimental
data to determine if they are appropriate for lithium-ion cell vent gas. Based on the lower
error from experimental to computed, this validates by Jones and Bounaceur as potential
methods to compute LFL for battery vent gas compositions.
3.2.2 Battery Vent Gas LFL
The LFL and adiabatic temperature criteria values for the battery species comes
from various literature sources such as the studies by Bounaceur et al. (93) and Vidal et
al. (95). The LFL values for each individual species is are used for predicting the vent gas
composition lower flammability limits with Le Chatelier’s Principle.
Table 3.4: LFL and Adiabatic Criteria for Vent Gas
CO H2 CH4 C2H4 C2H6 C3H8
Tad Criteria (K) 1417 629 1480 1369 1602 1509
LFL (%Volume) 12.5 4 5 2.7 3 2.1
Table 3.4 gives the adiabatic temperature criteria used in the method by Bounaceur
et al. When comparing the LFL values obtained using the method by Jones with experimen-
tal data from Somandepalli et al., there are differences in the results. When comparing with
Somandepalli, the LFL reported was 6.3% for the 100% SOC test. Yet the computed values
show 8.1%. The method by Bounaceur gives a value of 8.5%. Computations for LFL using
the species composition from the study by Somandepalli et al. at 100% SOC are shown in
the table below:
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Table 3.5 compares the experimental data from Somandepalli with the four different
methods to calculate LFL in this section. Since the method by Jones only provides tables
for methane and the battery vent gas composition includes multiple hydrocarbons, this
will cause uncertainty. For the other methods, any species not in Cantera are binned with
propane. Since the LFL for methane is approximately 5% whereas propane has an LFL of
roughly 2%, this could account for the difference in the calculated value to be higher than
that of the experiment by Somandepalli. When comparing with Bounaceur’s method, the
results are a lot lower compared with the experimental data. The reason behind this could
be the larger amount of hydrogen and carbon-monoxide compared to the other species in the
vent gas composition. For the fuel composition measured from the LCO cell at 100% SOC,
hydrogen is 45.7% and carbon-monoxide is 37.8% of the fuel by volume. This causes the
overall mixed temperature to be 1066 K. When using the CAFT method, the prediction was
a lot higher due to the high adiabatic temperature assumed. The limitation of Bounaceur’s
method might come when the species composition has a large fraction of hydrogen. In this
case, Le Chatelier’s method actually has the lowest error between the different methods.
As shown in the dissertation by Zhao (96), based on the fuel species and the diluent volume
fraction, the percent error can be low. The trends show with methane and propane blends,
as the number of diluent increases, so does the percent error from the experimental value.
In table 3.3, with a diluent of about 60% to 70%, the error using Le Chatelier’s method has
a larger percent error compared to Jone’s and Bounaceur’s method has a much smaller error.
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Table 3.6: LFL Predictions for Battery Vent Gas
Le Chatelier’s CAFT Jone’s Bounaceur’s
LCO 6.5 to 7.5 10.3 to 13.6 8.1 to 8.8 5.8 to 8.5
LFP 8.3 to 8.7 18.2 to 20.6 9.4 to 10.0 8.6 to 8.7
NCA 6.2 to 9.8 13.7 to 16.7 6.7 to 10.9 7.6 to 11.8
Looking at table 3.6, the predictions for LFL of the battery vent gas have a large
range of results based on the method used. Each method has its own set of uncertainties
and constraints on how it can be applied. Clearly, the CAFT method is going to have the
largest error and should not be used for hydrocarbon, hydrogen, carbon-monoxide and inert
diluent mixtures. The estimated LFL is much higher than any of the other methods, as
mentioned due to the hydrogen effect and adiabatic flame criteria being so much lower. By
modifying the CAFT method with a mixed adiabatic temperature, Bounaceur’s method is
a lot more reasonable and has about the same error as Jone’s method when compared with
experimental data in table 3.3. Le Chatelier’s method works and is well known but based
on the mixture the other provided methods could have a lower uncertainty.
3.2.3 Laminar Flame Speed Analysis
Once a flammable mixture has been created, an ignition source can cause the mixture
to ignite. In the event a cell is in thermal runaway, this can raise the local temperature
and cause piloted ignition. This will generate a flame front that will propagate through the
unburned gas mixture at a speed known as the laminar flame speed (SL). This flame speed
generally increases with increasing temperature and decreases with increasing pressure. The





Where T and p are the temperature and pressure of the unburned gas. This flame
speed is an essential input for calculating explosion pressures and vent requirements needed
to design safety systems.
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Figure 3.3: Laminar Flame Structure Diagram
Figure 3.3 (87) gives an overview of the actual laminar flame construction. As the
fuel and oxidizers approach the flame front, their temperature increases due to an increase in
conduction and radiation heat transfer from the flame front. As the temperature increases,
there is a chemical reaction as the temperature becomes locally high enough to ignite
the reactant. The reaction regime continues to propagate as a flame front, as reactions
chain together and continue to engulf the reactants. This is due to the excess energy from
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combustion raising the temperature, helping spread the flame front. Propagation speeds
below the speed of sound are known as deflagration and speeds above the speed of sound
are known as detonation. The speed of sound is c = 343 m/s in dry air at 20 ◦C. Anything
above would become a detonation. There is a deflagration to detonation transition (DDT)
where turbulent conditions can cause a deflagration flame propagation to accelerate into
a detonation wave. This detonation wave must develop in front of the flame front due to
conservation laws, which cause a shockwave in front of the flame to form. Additionally,
turbulent conditions can come from obstacles the wavefront has to accelerate around and
other disturbances (87). Deflagration speeds vary from less than 1 m/s up to 3 m/s whereas
detonation speeds are anywhere from 1.5 to 2.8 km/s (98) and cause a pressure rise.
The equivalence ratio is defined as the mass ratio of fuel to air compared to the
stoichiometric mass ratio of fuel to air. When it equals one, this means there is no excess fuel
or air, giving a balanced reaction. As the equivalence ratio goes above one, this means there
is excess fuel or a rich mixture. As the equivalence ratio goes below one, this is considered
a lean mixture as there is left over oxygen on the product side of the reaction. The laminar
flame speed is at a maximum near the stoichiometric conditions for hydrocarbons, usually
with an equivalence ratio just over one (97). Cantera can automatically balance the fuel and
oxidizer mixture through the range of equivalence ratios. The equivalence ratio is defined
as follows :
Φ =




Hydrocarbon Laminar Flame Speed Comparison






























































Figure 3.4: Cantera Model Verification with Literature
The results from figure 3.4 show the computed laminar flame speeds for propane
and methane from Cantera compared with literature values (99) along with hydrogen and
a hydrogen/carbon-monoxide mixture from Cantera compared with literature values (99;
100). The temperature and pressure were set at 300 Kelvin and one atmosphere.
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Table 3.7: Maximum Flame Speed Comparison
Max Flame
Speed (cm/s)
Propane Methane Hydrogen Hydrogen/CO
Literature 0.41 0.38 2.81 1.83
Computed 0.50 0.37 3.05 2.01
Percent
Difference (%)
22.21 2.73 8.53 10.12
Comparing the computed values for methane compared to the literature values,
there is almost no deviation in the two. Only once the equivalence ratio is above 1.20 do
the flame speeds vary slightly, but the difference is small. When comparing propane in the
same fashion, there is a more obvious deviation between the two. Figure 3.4 shows that
the laminar flame speed for propane is slightly higher than the literature values by about
6-10 cm/s. Yet when looking at the overall compositions of the battery vent gas from 3.1,
with the hydrocarbons only taking up about 15% to 25% of the composition by volume and
propane only taking up a fraction of that volume, this was not a large concern with the
model. Also, when comparing with other literature that used Cantera such as Johnsplass
et al. (101), the propane flame speed compared with the study are very similar in terms of
peak flame speeds, showing there is something in Cantera causing the deviation. Similarly,
the hydrogen and carbon-monoxide mixture model is slightly higher than the literature, but
again only by about 25 cm/s at the peak. The peak flame speeds are well above the 250
cm/s. It should be noted that hydrogen has a much higher flame speed than propane and
methane, which will be discussed when comparing different battery vent gas compositions.
Overall, all the literature reviews show close comparisons with the models from Cantera.
The only species with a large deviation is propane. Between propane not being the dominant
species in the battery gas mixtures and the sensitivity study not showing drastic changes
when the volume percentage of propane changes, it was not considered a major concern.
When comparing the literature for different flame speeds of higher order hydrocarbons
(102; 103; 99) , it can be noted that n-butane, n-pentane, and toluene have extremely
similar laminar flame speed profiles when compared to propane. It appears that each of the
different higher-level hydrocarbons has similar properties. Also, many of the higher order
hydrocarbon species in the original compositions are of a small percentage by volume. This
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gives a basis behind ’binning’ the original species not included in GRI-Mech into propane.
To ensure that this assumption was valid, a sensitivity study was performed by varying the































Figure 3.5: Propane and Methane Sensitivity Review
Figure 3.5 compares the flame speed of one battery gas composition by binning the
hydrocarbons not available in Cantera into either methane, propane or split between both.
Comparing the maximum flame speed of using methane as the binned gas verse propane
gives a difference of 1.5 cm/s at the peak flame speed. This difference is small when the
peak is almost 50 cm/s for each binned groups.
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3.2.4 Maximum Pressure
The final explosion characteristic discussed is the maximum constant volume adiabatic
overpressure. This is the pressure that is generated when the gas is combusted in a perfectly
adiabatic, constant volume process. This pressure is dependent on the temperature, species
composition of the burned gas and how the flame propagates. The maximum overpressure
is computed as the theoretical pressure the gas could possibly generate and is an important
input into explosion consequences. Cantera was used to calculate this pressure, which
is known as the maximum pressure or Pmax. The values for Pmax vary depending on the








Equation 3.6 gives the relationship between the initial pressure and pressure after
non-vented deflagration based on the number of moles of reactants, the number of moles
after burning occurs and initial and burned gas temperatures. The constant volume adiabatic
reaction used for determining Pmax is a thermochemical problem (31).
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Figure 3.6: Adiabatic Flame Temperature by Cathode Chemistry at 100% SOC
Figure 3.6 shows the different bands give the minimum to maximum theoretical
maximum adiabatic flame temperature, Tad, the range for each cathode chemistry vent
gas composition at 100% SOC. Using the equilibrium solver in Cantera with the various
vent gas species gives the adiabatic flame temperature. As shown in equation 3.6, Pmax is
dependent on this flame temperature, as well as the total number of moles before and after
deflagration. The maximum Tad comes at an equivalence ratio between 1.1 to 1.2, with the
NCA, LCO, and LFP chemistries having a much higher temperature compared to the LFP
chemistry.
3.3 Results of Models using Battery Vent Gas
The first set of results to discuss is for laminar flame speed. To help validate the
model even further, comparisons to a similar study by Johnsplass et al. (101) who used
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the data from the 2014 paper by Golubkov et al. (72) to model the laminar flame speeds.
The paper by Johnsplass used the species compositions from Golubkov to determine the
laminar flame speeds as a function of the equivalence ratio using Cantera. The three flame
speed plots that Johnsplass presented were compared to help further validate the model.
The battery vent gas compositions were for LFP, LCO and NMC chemistries, in which the
flame speed plots compared to Johnplass were observed to be very similar and have very
close overall peak flame speed. This assured that the model aligns with other studies and
could be used to predict the flame speeds for other vent gas compositions.
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Figure 3.7: Laminar Flame Speed Plots by Cathode Chemistry
Figure 3.7 gives the laminar flame speeds at varying states of charge organized by
the failed cells cathode chemistry. Not all results were given, rather a range of flame speeds
with increasing SOC. The results show that as the state of charge in the cell increases, the
overall laminar flame speed increases. There are some interesting observations to note. The
LCO cells have a peak flame speed of anywhere from 0.4 to 0.6 m/s as the SOC increases.
The peak values are at an equivalence ratio of roughly 1.1. The LFP cells have a lower
overall flame speed, with a peak between 0.4 and 0.5 ms/. The literature gives higher
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overall SOC tests when compared to the LCO cells in which there are only two sets of data
with a cell over 100% SOC. By referring to Table 3.1, the volume fraction of carbon-dioxide
in the vent gas composition begins to increase with the SOC for LFP cells. This is possibly
why at higher SOC the flame speeds are not increasing to the range of the other cells.
Lastly, the NCA cells have the highest overall flame speed between 0.6 to 0.8 for the peaks
at an equivalence ratio of 1.2 to 1.4. This can directly be linked to an increased amount of
hydrogen and much less carbon dioxide in the vent gas compositions for the NCA cells.

























Figure 3.8: Laminar Flame Speed Plots by Cathode Chemistry at 100 % SOC
Figure 3.8 shows the range of flame speeds at 100% SOC for varying chemistries.
This figure clearly shows a large difference in the flame speeds for different chemistries at the
same SOC. While flammable gas hazards are mainly based on the concentration in space,
the results from the flame speed model show that understanding the specific cell state of
charge, cathode chemistry, and even form factor is important as they vary for each case as
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shown in the literature review. Figure 3.8 also shows that NCA cells clearly have a larger
flame speed.


























Figure 3.9: Maximum overpressure by Cathode Chemistry at 100% SOC
Figure 3.9 shows the range of pressure for the maximum pressure at 100% SOC for
varying chemistries. The maximum overpressure values for different chemistries show less
of a variation than the laminar flame speed. The NCA cell chemistry has a lower overall
overpressure due to the composition containing more hydrogen, thus having a lower overall
molar mass compared to the LCO chemistry vent gas composition. As with the laminar
flame speeds, the maximum overpressure is lower for the LFP cells compared with the NCA
and LCO cells. Also, as the equivalence ratio increases, the variation in flame speeds and
maximum overpressure increases.
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3.4 Ranking Vent Gas Hazards











LCO 5.8 to 8.8 0.50 to 0.66 7.81 to 8.44
LFP 8.6 to 10.0 0.37 to 0.42 7.38 to 7.60
NCA 6.7 to 11.8 0.69 to 1.07 7.74 to 8.13
Table 3.8 shows the range for the lower flammability limit, maximum flame speed,
and maximum overpressure. The lower flammability limit values are presented taking the
minimum and maximum values from the method by Jones and Bounaceur to establish a
range. The values for the flame speed and maximum overpressure are displayed for the
equivalence ratio which the maximum flame speed occurs to quantify the hazards of each
cell chemistry.
The results overall show that the LFP cell chemistry generally has a higher flammab-
ility limit at 100% SOC, which allows more gas to accumulate before reaching a deflagration
or fire hazard compared with the NCA or LCO cells. The NCA cells do have one instance
where the LFL is higher at 100% SOC, which is the results from Lammer (2017) as seen
in table 3.1 which has a higher amount of carbon dioxide compared to the other NCA
vent gas compositions. The LFP cells also have a lower overall maximum overpressure and
laminar flame speed. This is important when considering safety as both values increase,
so does the associated hazard and level of risk. When building structures are intended
to house flammable gases such as hydrogen, methane or propane, an understanding of the
maximum overpressure and laminar flame speed directly is needed to design via performance
or prescribed safety systems.
The NCA cells have a higher concentration of hydrogen by volume and much less
carbon dioxide, which is an inert diluent. The overall, hydrocarbons have similar concentra-
tions per volume for all the cells as seen in figure 3.1. In 2015, Li et. al. (104) performed
experiments in an explosion tube to compare hydrogen with the hydrocarbon methane.
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The experiments compared the flame speed and rate of pressure rise of the two gases when
ignited in the explosion tube. The overall conclusions when comparing the two gases is
that hydrogen has a higher explosion intensity and will lead to a more massive burst or
blast damage. This can directly be associated with the higher flame speed and maximum
overpressure shown in the models for NCA and LCO from the effects of hydrogen compared
with methane or other hydrocarbons. This directly correlates into the NCA and LCO cells
having a higher quantifiable level of hazard compared with the LFP cells when comparing
all the models.
With the electrical energy density of NCA and LCO cells being higher, the benefit
is a lower overall system weight compared to the LFP cells as shown in the table by Wu
et al. (105). Yet with higher pressures and flame speeds, the module and rack designs
safety systems should be designed to accommodate the higher consequence level from a
deflagration event based on the cell chemistry. To compensate for higher potential burst
damage from NCA cells, the module and rack designs may change with heavier duty and
thicker materials. Using this approach will potentially cause reconsideration in industries
such as aerospace where weight is a large factor and the electrical energy density is measured
with the mass of the safety systems being considered.
The intent of this section was to review the hazards associated with different lithium-
ion battery cells based on known literature. By understanding the battery vent gas, the
lower flammability limit, laminar flame speed, and maximum overpressure were computed.
By comparing the overall trends for different chemistries, the level of hazard can be compared.
The conclusion was that NCA and LCO cells provide a higher hazard during a failure
where off-gassing occurs. With a higher computed lower flammability limit and lower
laminar flame speeds and maximum overpressures, the LFP battery can be considered when
balancing the performance and allowable risk compared with the NCA and LCO cells. All
the computations were completed using methodology and tools are freely available allowing
users to analyze their own specific cases. This gives the ability for the safety community to
design systems based on their own battery cell parameters.
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The findings in this section are based on numerous tests performed over nearly
the past 20 years. Each test comprises of specific cell chemistry, electrolyte, form factor,
manufacturer, failure mode, cell capacity, SOC and experimental setup. This shows that
while a lot of data was covered, to further understand the associated risks and hazards of
each of the specific cell parameters encompass need to be investigated. The large range of
values within the results from each model shows there is a large variation in the various data
sets provided. This shows the need for additional testing to further develop and validate
the models. As more testing is completed to understand the species composition along with
the gas production and rates at the cell, module and rack levels, further quantifications can
be developed to understand the hazards.
3.5 Deflagration Application
In order to characterize Li-BESS deflagration hazards, a comparison with other
well-known explosion hazards will be made by comparing deflagration vent sizes. For
example, a purpose-built lithium-ion energy storage system container using an off-the-shelf
type iso-container is a common way to install a large system on a site without the need
for building a structure around it. The example in this application will be a 20 ft x 8 ft
x 8 ft (6.1 m x 2.44 m x 2.44 m) container that has a signal Li-BESS rack inside. The
total surface area that can have vents installed is 608 ft2 (65.2 m2). The structure is
assumed to have an ultimate strength of approximately 1.30 psi-g or 0.09 bar-g. The vent
sizes for the highest laminar flame speed based on Cantera results will be computed using
the methods prescribed in NFPA 68 for each lithium-ion battery chemistry at 100% SOC.
Various flammable gases and combustible dusts will also be used to calculate the vent sizes
and comparisons will be made.
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3.5.1 Explosion Scenario
Determining whether an explosion scenario might occur in the event of a Li-BESS
failure depends on if and how quickly it takes to reach the lower flammability limit. Yet
various factors will affect this time, such as the vent gas species, total BESS capacity, room
ventilation, and gas release rate. The total size of the Li-BESS is important to understand
based on how much gas is produced. To characterize the flammable gas, not only does
the species matter but so does the concentration. As shown in the vent gas analysis, the
flame speed, and overpressure peak when the equivalence ratio is above one or fuel rich.
Quantifying the worst case fuel concentration in a space is critical to design the safety
systems.
Figure 3.2 shows a slope of roughly 0.46 L of vent gas per kWh. This will be used to
determine the total gas volume produced for various capacity systems. With propagation
analysis and the total rate at which the vent gas is released still being researched and
determined, a conservative number of two hours to total release will be used. The total
exhaust rate will match that of the NFPA 1 Ch. 52 requirements at 1 CFM/ft2 (5.1
L/sec/m2). For the iso-container, the total ventilation rate is 160 CFM or 76 L/s. By using
conservation of mass, the total volume of gas released, and the exhaust rate can be used
to determine the time it takes to reach the lower flammability limit. Applying this to the
iso-container with the volume already known will show how long different Li-BESS with
varying capacities take to reach LFL during failure.
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Figure 3.10: Li-BESS Explosion Example
Figure 3.11 shows a simple case of what the mass flows of a perfectly mixed scenario
looks like. By using conservation of mass and differentiating, the total change in mass
is based on the total inlet and exhaust through space and the rate at which the fuel is
vented from the system. With the ventilation and the fuel venting rate known, the fuel





= ρinQin − ρQout (3.7)
Equation 3.7 shows the basic form of conservation of mass for a non-steady state
scenario.
Q = 14.844m2 ∗ (0.0051m3/sec/m2) = 0.076m3/sec (3.8)
The total volume flow rate from NFPA 1 Ch. 52 is as shown in equation 3.8 after
being multiplied by the floor area of the iso-container.














Using equation 3.10, the time at which the lower flammability limit is reached
for various Li-BESS can be obtained. After rearranging and solving the ODE for the
conservation of mass in a non-steady state scenario in equation 3.9, the total moles of fuel
compared to the total moles exhausted gives the concentration within the iso-container.
As the time approaches infinity, the effects of the exponential function go to zero and
equilibrium is reached where the concentration of the air and gas becomes constant. This
is seen in figure 3.11 below. This is a simple model to help visualize the lower flammability
limit and how various system sizes take different times to reach the lower flammability limit
if reached at all. This simple model gives a basic understanding of how the volume of space,
air ventilation and the failure characteristics of the Li-BESS vent gas hazard.






















Figure 3.11: Li-BESS Time to LFL
Figure 3.11 shows various capacity systems and how long it takes to reach the lower
flammability limit in the given iso-container. The lower flammability range is based on table
3.8 with the three different chemistries. It takes anywhere from about 100 or so seconds for
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the 250-kWh system to reach LFL. The 100 kWh takes anywhere from 225 to 460 seconds
and the 10-kWh system never actually achieves a gas concentration at LFL. This again is
based on the assumptions provided above.
Additionally, the upper flammability limit (UFL) can be used to understand how
a sealed system might reach UFL. Note that the ’sealed’ system will be assumed to have




A quick method to compute UFL is from equation 3.11 above (87). Using the higher LFL
value for the LCO cells at 100% SOC gives a UFL of 21.5% volume.





















Figure 3.12: Li-BESS UFL Sealed System
While UFL was not explored in this study to that extent that LFL was, it is
important to understand. In a sealed system, the gas concentration exceeded the UFL
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for this example. This can lead to a delayed ignition explosion condition, with a rich fuel
mixture. With the peak flame speed and overpressure occurring with an equivalence ratio
above one, this sealed Li-BESS could lead to a higher hazard. If firefighters attempt to enter
and inspect and/or shut the system off, the gas concentration can suddenly be reduced below
UFL and lead to an explosion scenario.
3.5.2 Deflagration Vent Sizing Guide
With an explosion being potentially occurring in the iso-container example, there
are various approaches to prevent or reduce the effects from deflagrations as mentioned in
chapter two. In this example, NFPA 68 Ch. 7 will be applied to determine the total vent
size for flammable gas mixtures. It will be assumed that a total of ten deflagration vents
will be used along the iso-container.
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Figure 3.13: NFPA 68 Vent Sizing Flow Chart
Figure 3.13 shows the general flow chart provides to help visualize the process to
size deflagration vents. Based on inputs such as flame speed, maximum-pressure, unburned
gas density and known parameters such as L/D, enclosure volume, and the total enclosure
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ultimate strength, different calculations are used. Based on the limitations of NFPA 68
such as the L/D correlation being less than 5 and the laminar flame speed less than 3 m/s,
this method can be used. If these limitations are exceeded, a performance-based analysis
must be made within the guidance of NFPA 68 Ch. s five or nine. There are two sets of
equations to calculate the vent size: high or low Pred. The reduced pressure or Pred is the
maximum pressure in a vented enclosure. This is unlike Pmax or the maximum pressure in
a non-vented enclosure. The reduced pressure will be based on 2/3 of the total ultimate
strength of the structure being analyzed. The following list gives all the variables required
for NFPA 68 Deflagration Vent Calculations:
Av0 = the vent area calculated from Equation 7.2.1a or 7.2.2a (m
2)
AS = the enclosure internal surface area determined according to 7.2.5 (m
2)
au = unburned gas-air mixture sound speed
C d = vent flow discharge coefficient, assumed to be 0.70 unless vent occupies a complete
wall, then use 0.80
Gu = unburned gas-air mixture sonic flow mass flux (kg/m
2-s)
P0 = the enclosure pressure prior to ignition (bar-g)
Pmax = the maximum pressure developed in a contained deflagration by ignition of the
same gas-air mixture (bar-g)
P red = the maximum pressure developed in a vented enclosure during a vented deflagration
(bar-g)
P stat = vent burst pressure (bar-g)
S u = fundamental burning velocity of gas-air mixture (m/s)
γb = ratio of specific heats for burned gas-air mixture
λ= turbulent flame enhancement factor based on obstructions and L/D, determined
according to 7.2.6
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µu = Unburned gas-air dynamic viscosity (kg/m-s)
ρu = mass density of unburned gas-air mixture (kg/(m
3))
In Cantera, the various gas properties can be computed by balancing the species
based on the inputted equivalence ratio. The unburned density and gas-air dynamic viscosity
are directly computed in Cantera as a gas property. Other values, such as flame speed,
maximum pressure, and the sound speed of the gas are computed with separate codes. If
the burned properties are needed, then it must go through an equilibrium process using
Gibbs free energy method. The burned gas ratio of specific heats can then be computed
after this step. The sonic flow mass flux used was based on the prescribed value in NFPA 68.
the requirement is the enclosure is at ambient temperatures, 230.1 kg/m2-s. Additionally,
P0 is assumed to be slightly below atmospheric based on ASHRAE 21, and is assumed to
be 1 bar-g. The vent flow discharge coefficient, Cd, is prescribed from NFPA 68 and will be
set at 0.70. The total available surface area, AS , is 56.5 m
2. The cross-sectional area down
the long axis of the iso-container is 5.96 m2.
Most non-purpose-built structures are going to be under the 0.5 bar-g threshold and
considered a low Pred structure. For example, Annex I in NFPA 68 gives the example of
a steel frame, metal-clad building to have an ultimate structure strength of 0.072 bar-g.
In this case, the iso-container is assumed to have an ultimate strength of 0.09 bar-g, as it
is like the metal-clad type structure, but with thicker walls and rather than fasteners, a
welded structure. Using the 2/3 method to find the reduced pressure value, this would give
a value of 0.06 for Pred.
Based on figure 3.13, the flame speeds must be less than 3 m/s and the L/D must
be less than or equal to 5. The hydraulic diameter is assumed to be based on the area along
the longer axis of the iso-container. The length to hydraulic diameter ratio is based on the
overall length of the structure over the hydraulic diameter, Dhe . Equation 3.12 gives the






Plugging in the effective area of 5.95 m2 and the perimeter of 9.76 m gives a Dhe
of 2.43 m. Then the L/D can be computed with the length being 6.1 m and L/D equal
to be 2.50. With this being the case, there is a required L/D correction factor that must
be computed. With this known, and the flame speeds for the battery vent gas no more
than 1.07 m/s as shown in table 3.8, the vent size calculations can be made through this
prescribed method.
Now that all of the inputs and parameters are established, the next step in the flow
chart is to determine which vent size equation will be used. Equation 3.13 and equation
3.14 give the low inertia and low Pred equations to size the vent area. Low inertia is based
on the overall mass per surface area ratio of the deflagration vent panel, which is required to
be less than 40 kg/m2. If the vent panel is greater or equal to 40 kg/m2, panel inertia effects

































Equation 3.15 gives the vent sizing method for a Pred is greater than 0.5 bar-g. is
















With the value for Pred being 0.06 bar-g, equations 3.13 and 3.14 will be used to
determine the deflagration vent area. Ultimately, all of the inputs for C, the Low Inertia
Vent Area Coefficient, need to be computed for equation 3.14. Following the flow chart the
first turbulence factor, λ0, needs to be computed.
λ0 = φ1φ2 (3.17)







0.39, if Ref ≥ 4000
]
(3.18)
Equation 3.18 gives the first factor to determine the turbulent flame enhancement
factor, λ0. φ1 is based on the Reynolds number of the flame front through the hydraulic
diameter of the structure. The Reynolds number is a dimensionless value that measures the
ratio of inertial forces to the viscous force which described characteristics that are used to





Where ρ is the density in units of mass/volume, v is the velocity in distance over
length and l is the characteristic length. By placing the dynamic viscosity µ in the denominator





Equation 3.20 gives the calculation for the Reynolds number for the flame front
through the hydraulic diameter. The flame speed, unburned gas mixture and dynamic
viscosity are computed in Cantera. Once φ1 is computed, φ2 must also be computed. One
thing to note on how this calculation is not quite straightforward is the fact that φ2 is based
off the Reynolds number through the actual deflagration vent. This requires a guess at the
initial vent size. The vent size is then calculated and numerous iterations of the calculation
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with the previous resulting vent area inputted as the guessed value used until the resulting













For equation 3.21, the values for β1 and β2 are prescribed constants from NFPA 68,






The Reynolds number through the actual vent is shown to be dependent on the
hydraulic diameter of the vent itself, Dv as shown in equation 3.22 above. Again, Dv
is initially guessed and through iterative calculations using the resulting vent hydraulic








The velocity used to calculate the Reynolds number through the vent is based on
the effect of choked flow. When the flow of fluid reaches Mach 1 or the speed of sound, the
flow is choked and limited to this velocity. The velocity of the mixture through the vent is
based on either the pressure and density or the speed of sound of the mixture, whichever is
more limiting.
Now that λ0 can be computed, the next step is to understand how the obstructions
and L/D effects are accounted for in the calculations. Obstructions are various equipment
and internal structures based on the following:
• Piping, tubing or conduit that is bigger than 1/2” (12.7 mm)
• Structural items such as columns, beams, and joints
• Stairways and railings
• Any other equipment with dimensions ranging from 2” to 20” (50.8 mm to 508 mm)
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If the total surface area of the obstructions, Aobs, is less than or equal to 20% of
the total structure surface area, then λ1 is equal to λ0. If Aobs is greater than 20% of the
surface area of the structure, use equation 3.24 below to determine the obstruction factor:






Various obstructions can cause the flame front to propagate quicker. This is due
to the flame acceleration around the obstructions. This can cause turbulence, drastically
increasing the flame speed into the hundreds of meters per second which causes higher
pressures and can lead to more damage from deflagration. The study by Gexcon (106; 107)
showed various scenarios of deflagration inside of an iso-container. The different tests showed
the effects of hydrogen gas explosions due to change in hydrogen volume, deflagration vent
sizes, and various obstructions. As the obstructions increased due to additional gas cylinders











Once the effects of obstructions are determined, the final flame enhancement factor
to determine is for the L/D relationship. As determined before, L/D is exactly 2.5 for this
iso-container. Based on equation 3.25, this would mean λ1 would equal λ. This is also
the case for any L/D less than 2.5. If the L/D value is between 2.5 and 5, equation 3.25
applies. Anything over 5 for L/D, as previously mentioned other methods not prescribed
in NFPA 68 Ch. 7 will need to be used. Essentially, as L/D increases, the flame speed
also does as there is more confinement involved with a long and narrow structure such as
a pipe or tunnel. In a non-vented case with a higher L/D, the flame front will propagate
from one end to the other, decelerating as pressure begins to build due to the trapped fuel
on the opposite end. In some cases, the flame will propagate in two directions based on the
ignition point. With the large L/D, there is the potential for the flame speed to increase
to transition from deflagration to a detonation (108). This is the main reason NFPA 68
limits the L/D to prevent the calculations from breaking down due and staying conservative.
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Once the flame enhancement factor has been set, the results for the vent area can be
computed using equation 3.13 and 3.14. These results are then used to input as the guessed
results in the calculation for the Reynolds number through the vent.
3.5.3 Combustible Dust
While combustible dust is not the focus point of this analysis, it will be used to use
as a further comparison to the vent gas deflagration hazard. The deflagration index, Kst
(bar-m/s), is used to rank the explosion hazard of combustible dust. Another important
parameter for the analysis of explosion scenarios is the rate of pressure rise. The rate of
pressure rise is usually compared using the parameter Kg, which is calculated using the







The combustible dust index has three classes, with a class one having a Kst value
from 0 to 200 bar-m/s, class two having a Kst value from 200 to 300 bar-m/s and class
three having a Kst value above 300 bar-m/s (109). Some examples of a class one are
sugars, powdered milk, a class two can be wood flour, cellulose and a class three could
be aluminum or magnesium (36). While the flame speed is used to analyze flammable
gases, this deflagration index is still used in deflagration safety standards, such as NFPA
68. Deflagration vents will be sized in accordance with NFPA 68 Ch. 8 for this iso-container
example.
3.5.4 Vent Size Results
The method used to compute the deflagration vent size for the flammable gas
mixtures was to take the equivalence ratio for the highest possible flame speed. This is
conservative since the flame speed is directly multiplied in equation 3.14 so as it increases,
the vent size directly increases. Once the concentration of gas is determined, it is assumed
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the total iso-container is filled to the with the specific gas composition and worst-case
concentration.
Table 3.9: Deflagration Vent Size for Explosion Hazards
Deflagration Hazard: Flame Speed (m/s) Kst (bar-m/s) Pmax (bar-g) Vent Size (m
2)
Class 1 Dust: Sugar – 138 8.5 5.2
Class 3 Dust: Aluminum – 415 12.4 19
Propane 0.40 – 8.6 5.2
Hydrogen 2.80 – 7.4 33
LCO 100% SOC 0.49 - 0.65 – 7.8 - 8.4 6.7 to 10
LFP 100% SOC 0.37 - 0.42 – 7.4 - 7.6 4.0 to 4.9
NCA 100% SOC 0.69 - 1.07 – 7.7 - 8.1 10 to 32
Table 3.9 shows various vent sizes for the prescribed iso-container. Two different
combustible dusts, sugar at a class one and aluminum at class two were added as a
comparison. As discussed before, the combustible dust used the deflagration index, whereas
flammable gases use the flame speed to size the vents. Appendix A gives the code used to
compute the vent sizes for flammable gas hazards.
The various compositions for each cathode chemistry at 100% SOC are also presented
in table 3.9 along with hydrogen and methane. The range for compositions with the highest
and lowest flame speed from various literature are shown also. This gives an understanding
of how the three compositions compare with known hazards. As shown earlier, the LFP
chemistry has the lowest flame speed and Pmax compared to LCO and NCA. This shows
with the results of the deflagration vent size being much less than the lower end sizes for
both LCO and NCA cell chemistry. The NCA cell chemistry shows a much higher vent size
on the upper end of the range at 32 m2, like hydrogen. This is due to both a higher flame
speed, but also a higher Pmax. The NCA cells can be compared somewhere along the lines
of class three combustible dust and hydrogen. This factor should be highly considered in
designing systems using NCA cells. Additionally, with the results from table 3.1 consisting
of varying form factor types, failures, and cell capacities, these effects must be further
investigated to understand how they affect the species compositions. But this vent size
analysis helps understand how Li-BESS systems compare with well-known hazards that
have already been researched and mitigated.
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Figure 3.14: Vent Size vs Obstruction vs Pred
Figure 3.14 above shows the effect of obstructions and Pred on the total vent size.
The iso-container application with the NCA cell chemistry and composition with the highest
flame speed was used for this analysis. This shows both how a higher Pred, from 0.05
to 0.15 bar-g, reduces the vent area to roughly half. The biggest contribution to a large
required vent area is based on the number of obstructions. With purpose-built iso-containers
containing all the necessary equipment to operate Li-BESS which includes conduit, control
equipment, transformers, inverters, cooling systems, structural beams and reinforcements
and other various objects that meet the criteria. As these obstructions increase, the total
required vent area increases as shown in equation 3.24, as an exponential function of the
square root of the obstruction surface area to container surface area. The total vent size
drastically increases as the obstruction area gets above about 30% especially at lower Pred
values below 0.1 bar-g.
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by 1.82 m long
60 0.013 0.0230
Control Systems 0.5 m3 6 7.5 13.27
HVAC Equipment




0.2 m by 0.2 m
by 0.05 m
2 0.004 0.0071
Total Obstruction Area Percentage
of Iso-container Surface Area (%)
13.40
Table 3.10 shows various examples of obstructions that might be found inside of
the energy storage iso-container. While the total surface area of the obstructions does not
exceed 20% of the total surface area in these examples, if these energy storage systems
were installed in equipment rooms packed with additional equipment and conduit it could
exceed this threshold. With large numerous conduits and piping systems along with pumps,
control panels, structural members and more. As these systems are installed in different
locations, it is important to understand these obstructions and how the vent size is greatly
affected by them.
Studies have been performed to show the effects of blockage or obstructions on both
flame speeds and overpressure. Various experiments to determine the effect of blockage on
flame speeds and overpressure were performed in a cylindrical vessel by Na’Inna at al. (110).
Methane was ignited, and the maximum flame speed and pressure was determined. As the
blockage ratio increased, from 0 to 0.4, the flame speed went up by about 4-5 times and
the maximum pressure went up by about 10 to 12 times. Blockage due to a cross-sectional
area, not a surface area would make more sense. NFPA 68 specifies the total external area
surface area of obstructions rather than a cross-sectional area. This needs to be further
investigated and updated.
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3.6 Partial Volume Effects
If the vent area calculated using a full volume deflagration cannot be feasibly integ-
rated without having issues with the actual structure, partial volume effects are permissible.
Rather than assuming the iso-container or other space is filled completely with a specified






Equation 3.27 gives the partial fill fraction based on the stoichiometric volume
concentration and the ratio of gas volume to structure volume. If the fraction is less than
one, the partial volume method can be used. Essentially, what equation 3.27 shows is
whether the mixture in the space is fuel rich or fuel lean, based on the stoichiometric
concentration. If the mixture is fuel lean, then partial volume computations are allowed. If







Π = Pred/Pmax (3.29)
Based on equations 3.28 and 3.29, the partial volume vent area is based on the ratio
of pressures and the partial volume fill fraction in order to reduce the total area. The most
difficult part of this method is to determine the total volume and composition of a gas cloud
that is produced by Li-BESS. In other scenarios might be better understood such as a gas
leak. If the flow rate of a gas leak can is known, along with the response rate to shut the
gas leakage off, the total volume in the space can be calculated. Additionally, with a single
gas, the stoichiometric concentration can easily be understood. Yet, with Li-BESS the
volume and composition are based on the state of charge, form factor, failure, capacity, and
chemistry, showing how this method should be implemented as conservatively as possible.
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Using the iso-container with a total enclosure volume, Venc, equal to 36.32 m
3, using
figure 3.2 showing the total volume release of 0.46 L/Wh, the partial method can be used.
Based on figure 3.11, a 30-kWh system can be used in conjunction with the volume to
capacity production to determine the volume produced, Vgas. A 30-kWh system would
produce 13800 liters of gas or 13.8 m3.



















LFP 0.28 7.6 1.36 4.9 4.9 0
LCO 0.238 8.4 1.60 10 10 0
NCA 0.249 8.1 1.53 32 32 0
15 6.9
LFP 0.28 7.6 0.68 4.9 3.5 28
LCO 0.238 8.4 0.80 10 8.3 17
NCA 0.249 8.1 0.76 32 25.5 20
7.5 3.45
LFP 0.28 7.6 0.34 4.9 2.0 60
LCO 0.238 8.4 0.40 10 4.6 54
NCA 0.249 8.1 0.38 32 14 55
Using equations 3.27, 3.28 and 3.29, table 3.11 shows how the partial volume calcula-
tions based on the total volume produced from various sized Li-BESS systems. Based on
the requirement for Xr to be less than one for partial volume calculations to be allowed,
only the 7.5 and 15 kWh systems meet this requirement. The 30-kWh system produces too
much gas by volume based on the rate of 0.46 L/Wh. It will still require the same sized
vents as calculated in table 3.9. The partial volume effects for the 15 kWh systems reduced
the total vent area by 17-20%. The 7.5 kWh system has a much larger reduction in total
vent size, anywhere from 54-60%. For the NCA cell chemistry, the vent size reduced by 18
m2 or 32% of the total iso-container available surface area. As noted, before, this more of
a performance-based calculation, with assumptions of the total volume playing a large role
in this reduction of vent area.
Computing the deflagration vent size for the example iso-container is done with an
understanding of the Li-BESS chemical species and characteristics along with prescribed
standards. By using NFPA 68 to size deflagration vents for various cell chemistries, an
understanding of how the explosion hazard of Li-BESS ranks with other well-known species
was established. Taking this known prescriptive method and exercising is at this level helps
understand the hazard. This is a great starting point for this understanding and should be
further researched and understood.
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Chapter 4
Lithium-Ion Cell Fuel Load and Fire Guidelines
In addition to explosion hazards, Li-BESS present a unique fire hazard. As previously
mentioned, the suppression system designs for these systems are challenging and no formal
guidance is available. This presents a unique challenge for the safety community. While
some large-scale tests have been conducted on both bulk storage of lithium-ion cells along
with Li-BESS, an understanding of the small-scale testing is important to help characterize
and understand these larger scale tests. Various tests using oxygen consumption calorimetry
will be performed in order to help understand on a cell and cell array level how the heat
release rate and total heat released compares with other commodities.
4.1 Current Suppression Methods
As mentioned in chapter two, NFPA 13 does not have any guidance for designing
sprinkler systems for lithium-ion cells in general. This applies to both Li-BESS and individual
lithium-ion cells. Yet the current draft for NFPA 855 states that water is the preferred
agent for fighting lithium-ion battery fires. At a large-scale level, FM Global has performed
two sets of tests: flammability of lithium-ion cells in bulk storage (59) and development of
sprinkler protection for Li-BESS (111). This bulk storage test compared various lithium-ion
commodities in rack storage with cartoned unexpanded plastic and class 2 commodities.
When comparing the heat release rate, lithium-ion cylindrical and polymer cells have small
bump followed by a large increase in the HRR with multiple bumps as the lithium-ion cells
and other combustibles were involved in the fire. The class 2 commodity and cartoned
unexpanded plastic commodity had a lot quicker and sharper HRR, with one large spike
compared with the lithium-ion cells.
With bulk storage, sprinkler effectiveness is based on activation time, coverage and
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capacity. Li-BESS present a unique hazard due to the sealed nature of the system. With the
racks being closed, this prevents effective coverage of a suppression system directly onto a
lithium-ion battery fire. Additionally, the electrical energy present in these systems presents
an additional hazard. NFPA 13 Ch. 8 does not require sprinkler systems in electrical rooms
when there is only dedicated electrical equipment, dry-type electrical equipment enclosed
by two-hour fire barriers and no combustible storage. With the possibility of Li-BESS
installed in an existing electrical type room, suppression systems may not be installed. This
makes it difficult to enforce suppression systems for Li-BESS with lack of documentation
or understanding on whether it is needed or not. The presentation by Ben Ditch from FM
Global at the 2018 NFPA SUPDET Suppression Program Presentation gave a preview of
the large-scale testing performed to evaluate sprinkler performance on Li-BESS. This test
has yet to be fully released but gives some ideas of free burning and sprinkled Li-BESS and
what their recommended sprinkler design practice is.
One similar comparison to Li-BESS is server racks in term of the shape of the system
and electrical hazard. Again, with Li-BESS, using a suppression system that involves water
can lead to an electrical hazard. Additionally, remote locations do not necessarily have the
quantity of water required to fight these fires. If these systems are installed at a substation in
a remote location without a consistent water supply provided, fighting a Li-BESS fire will be
difficult. As shown in chapter two, various lithium-ion battery fires have been extinguished
by constant water. A recent example shows a BMW i8 all-electric car being dunked into
a pool of water as a method to extinguish the fire and left there while the batteries would
be cooled and was no longer a hazard (112). Telsa has guidelines that suggest it takes
approximately 3000 gallons of water to fight a fire for 2016+ Model S all-electric vehicle or
to use other methods such as CO2, dry chemicals or foam if enough water is not available
(113). Tesla also suggests allowing the battery to burn for up to 24 hours while protecting
all exposures. Leading back into the remote location, such as a sub-station or a renewable
resource system, a fire without enough water could lead to a potential wild-land fire hazard.
This brings up an entirely other hazard based on issues with extinguished fires within
these systems. These systems might require a large water supply, that may not be easily
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transported to a remote location. With Li-BESS racks being enclosed, it is difficult to get
water directly on the cells, which shows how the method of almost flooding the system is
needed. This is just an example of how difficult it is to quantify what the safety community
should do in terms of suppression, especially without proper guidance to size the water
system in NFPA 13 for lithium-ion cells. NFPA 13 Ch. 5 gives the following break-down
for classification of commodities:
• Class I: Noncombustible product placed on wood pallets, within corrugated cartons,
paper or shrink-wrapped
• Class II: Noncombustible product within wood crates, multi-layered corrugated cartons
or equivalent
• Class III: Wood, paper, natural fibers or group C plastics
• Class IV: Group B plastics, Containers containing 5%-15% group A unexpanded
plastics or 5% to 25% group A expanded plastics, or refer to figures 5.6.3.3.3
Each of these different classes of commodities requires different sprinkler design approaches
and requirements. NFPA 13 Ch. 14 gives various sprinkler density requirements. For
various classes and storage heights, the requirements such as K-factor, operating pressure,
and sprinkler density. The K-factor rates the discharge rate from the nozzle of a sprinkler
head. Understanding these commodities and how lithium-ion cells are characterized by
bench-scale cone calorimeter testing will help establish the fire hazard associated with
Li-BESS.
By understanding the smaller scale of how lithium-ion cells fail when burning, and
comparing to larger tests, characterizations and comparisons with other similar fire hazards
can be established. The array testing will provide an understanding of how long it takes
for one failed cell to propagate that failure to another. Additionally, this will help bring
an understanding of whether or not single cell data can be scaled to larger failures. This
exploratory type testing can help establish a way to further evaluate and understand the
fire safety of lithium-ion cells with both qualitative and quantitative analysis.
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4.2 Cone Calorimeter Testing
The heat release rate (HRR) is the rate at which combustion occurs and produces
heat and is measured in Watts. Full-scale HRR testing can be used to determine the
characteristics of full room fires. The total heat released (THR) is the total heat generated
from the complete combustion of a sample and is measured in Joules. The THR from a
bench-scale test can be used to obtain the heat of combustion. This can then be used when
summing fuel loads in a space to characterize the overall fire hazard. The heat of combustion
is the heat released per mass burnt and is a way to quantify fuel loads in units of kJ/g. In
testing larger scale fires, items such as sofas, furniture, and bulk storage of commodities will
help understand how fires evolve within the space and help make materials safer. Small-scale
or bench-scale testing is used to characterize certain materials such as plastics and foams in
order to compare and rank them with another. Understanding bench-scale data can help
understand and predict full-scale HRR and THR.
The bench-scale cone calorimeter uses the concept of oxygen consumption to measure
the HRR. With the exhaust gas oxygen concentration known, the HRR in kW is given by
the following per Chow et al. (114):
q̇ = E(ṁ0O2 − ṁO2) (4.1)
From equation 4.1, the mass flow of air from the intake gas, ṁ0O2 and the mass flow
of air in the exhaust gas, ṁO2 is measured and the oxygen consumed directly is proportional
to the HRR. As previously discussed, E is based on the heat of combustion to the oxygen
consumed and for most fuels, it equals 13.1 MJ/kgO2 (115). Additional corrections for
incomplete combustion where other species such as CO, CO2 and H2O are present in the
exhaust stream, additional corrections can be made using the following for incomplete
combustion of carbon monoxide and soot:
q̇ = E(ṁ0O2 − ṁO2)− (ECO − E)∆ṁCOO2 − (ES − E)∆ṁSO2 (4.2)
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In equation 4.2 according to Chow, ECO is approximately 17.7 MJ/kgO2 and ES
is approximately 12.3 MJ/kgO2 . Understanding and interpreting the results from these
calculations can be used for several metrics in such as predicting fire behavior, understanding
and ranking various hazards, and testing fireproofing and resistant materials. The THR is





Equation 4.3 shows how to compute the total heat released or THR. The HRR shows
how quickly a sample will take to burn and relates the fire size and hazard. The THR gives
an idea of how much heat the sample releases in that time. Various materials could have
different HRR curves, with one having a shorter burn time but a larger peak than the other.
Yet the THR could be very similar. The HRR is important to understand due to having
an object burns can affect any exposures.
4.3 Flammability Literature Review
Numerous studies have been conducted to determine the HRR and THR from
burning lithium-ion cells. In 2012, Ribiere et al. (62) used a Tewarson calorimeter to
determine the HRR of 2.9 Ah pouch cells. A Tewarson calorimeter is similar to the
mentioned cone calorimeter, but rather than having a conical heater above the sample,
infrared heaters are placed along the sides and pointed at the sample (116). A tube is
used to entrap the gases coming due to the combustion of the sample, which is pulled into
the collection hood and analyzed. These HRRs were compared with other fuels such as
gasoline, PMMA, and polyethylene. The HRR of cells at 0%, 50% and 100% SOC were
determined while burning the cells with a heat flux of 35 kW/m2. Somandepalli et al. (117)
also performed similar experiments using oxygen consumption calorimetry, but with LCO
2.1 Ah pouch cells. A heat flux of 35 kW/m2 was also used to burn cells at 0%, 50% and
100% SOC.
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Cylindrical cells, such as 18650 size, are more volatile compared to pouch cells due
to the construction and configuration. Unlike a pouch cell, the 18650 cell has a rolled
electrode or ’jelly roll’. The roll is placed into a hard-cylindrical case with a burst disk or
safety vent on the end. Quintiere et al. (118) with the University of Maryland and the
FAA conducted additional testing at the cell level to determine the flammability and fire
hazards associated with cylindrical cells. Specifically, 2.6 Ah 18650 LCO cells were tested.
An oxygen consumption cone calorimeter was used to determine the HRR, and THR for
various heat fluxes to burn the cell. A modified version of the standard ASTM E1345
sample holder was used to capture vent gases ejected from burning cell. These tests were
performed using various heat flux settings and for cells having a range of different SOC. The
FAA also performed thermal capacitance calorimetry to determine the energy required for
cell failure. Fu et al. in 2015 (75) exposed 18650 type cells a heat flux ranging from 30 to
60 kW/m2 on cells with a SOC ranging from 0% to 100%. With 18650’s being so volatile,
Fu et al. noted the time to ’explosion’ with the pressure build up released from the burst
disk. In 2015 and 2016, Liu et al. (119; 120) used a copper slug calorimeter to determine
the heat required to induce a failure. Three different cathode chemistries were used in these
experiments, including LCO, NMC, and LFP at varying SOC. The slug calorimeter was
placed with a hot wire above it in a standard cone calorimeter. This determined the HRR
and the failure point of the cylindrical cells.
While individual cell flammability testing shows the properties of various cells,
understanding the effects of propagation and how the hazard scales up is also important.
In 2015, Ping et al. (121) performed full-scale burning tests on an off the shelf 10 Ah LFP
cells in a 5-cell array. The largest face of the cells was pointed in the horizontal direction
and exposed to a 3-kW heater. The setup was placed in an ISO 9705 Full-Scale Room Fire
Test for Surface Products apparatus. The gas flue was collected and analyzed to determine
the HRR. Thermocouples were placed on the outside of the cell array on all sides except
for the bottom. Three tests were conducted with arrays at 0%, 50% and 100% SOC. The
effect of SOC and the HRR was determined, as the SOC increases, so do the peak HRR.
The peak HRR at 0% SOC is 7.7 kW, at 50% SOC it is 15.5 kW and at 100% SOC it peaks
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at 18.9% kW. As the SOC increases, the HRR nearly triples from 0% SOC to 100% SOC.
In 2016, Larsson et al. (122) used a propane burner with an HRR of 16 kW underneath
a five-cell array consisting of LFP pouch cells. By using LFP cells, oxygen production at
higher SOC values was not an issue in this test. The cells were wrapped together with
safety wire, and thermocouples were placed in-between each cell interface. By using oxygen
calorimetry method to determine the HRR can be determined for this array. Additionally,
the thermocouples establish the effects of failure from the top cell and how that failure
propagates through the array. Models using this data were created to help estimate the
effect of fire barriers in between the cell interfaces. The results of this review are tabulated
in table 4.1 below.




























































































4.3.1 Testing Setup and Procedures
Various tests were performed using lithium-ion pouch cells and ASTM E1354-17:
Standard Test Method for Heat and Visible Smoke Release Rates for Materials and Products
Using an Oxygen Consumption Calorimeter (123). The standard FTT Cone Calorimeter
setup from Fire Testing Technology was used for this experiment. This system uses oxygen
depletion calorimetry in order to understand the combustion process and the HRR can be
determined from these measurements (116). The testing order went as follows:
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1. Preliminary pouch cell cone calorimeter tests consisting of 500, 800, 1500 and 2000
mAh cells
2. Three single pouch cell tests at 0% SOC using 500 mAh and 800 mAh cells
3. Three single pouch cell tests at 0% SOC and electrolyte dried out for 72 hours using
500 mAh and 800 mAh cells
4. Three sets of five cell array at 0% SOC using 500 mAh and 800 mAh cells
5. Three sets of PMMA arrays using 5 3/16” samples with metalized moisture-resistant
polyester film
All of the cells used Lithium cobalt oxide or LCO as the cathode chemistry. Preliminary
tests were performed to gain an understanding of how the cells react in the cone calorimeter
and to decide what changes should be made in order to test arrays of cells. One test of a
single 500, 800, 1500 and 2000 mAh cell at 0% SOC and dried out cells were done just as a
baseline. One of the main concern was the effect of jetting and gas production overwhelming
the sensors. During preliminary testing, it was determined that the cells can be centered
in the sample tray, but the tabs of the pouch cell would need to be placed such that they
are on the back side or opposite side of the sample tray handle. It was noticed that the tab
side would start to off-gas first and with the spark ignitor above would cause the sample
to ignite. Placing the cell at the center of the sample tray with the tabs away from the
handle of the tray such that the ignitor was above the tabs was used for both single and
array tests. The 500 mAh cells were slightly off-set towards the ignitor due to the smaller
size for the single cell tests.
The main reason for keeping the cells at a nominal charge of zero is due to the
oxygen production associated with LCO cells. When oxygen consumption is the method
used to measure the HRR in the cone calorimeter experiments, any material that produces
oxygen will affect the measurement. While the total oxygen production can be established,
understanding the rate of oxygen production while the cell is burning is difficult to understand
and has not established. To the oxygen production for LCO cells has been established in
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studies by MacNeil et al. (124), Yamaki et al. (125) and from Wang et al. (126) give the
following suggested reaction for the decomposition of the delithiated LCO cells, Lix CoO2:







In equation 4.4 established by Wang, Yamaki and MacNeil, the oxygen generation
from the breakdown of the cathode material releasing oxygen, enabling the burning of the
electrolyte. The minimum value for x is 0.5 and the maximum value is 1. As the cell voltage
or SOC decreases, the value for x increases, giving a lower oxygen production during failure.
At a value of 1 for x, the oxygen production is either very little to none. This is important
to consider when using oxygen consumption as a method to measure HRRs.



















PL-403144-2C 4.3 x 34.5 x 40.0 1380 5934 500 mAh±5% 3.70 V 1.85 Wh 250 mA 2.75 V
PL-383562-2C 3.9 x 35.5 x 63.5 2254 8792 800 mAh±5% 3.70 V 2.96 Wh 400 mA 2.75 V
The first set of tests performed was with 0% SOC cells under a heat flux of 50 kW/m2
consistently for all tests. The cells were charged at 1 C to 100% SOC then discharged at
0.5 C to 2.75 volts or nominally 0% SOC. The tests were done using the standard ASTM
E1354 sample tray, by placing the cell at the center of the tray and using kaowool to raise
the top of the cell to nominally 25.4 mm below the conical heater.
The second set of tests were using the same cells, this time by drying cells out to
remove the electrolyte. After discharging the pouch cells, the end opposite of the tabs was
sliced open and the tape holding the separator sheets together was also sliced in half. The
separator sheets were spread apart as much as possible and the cells were pulled opened
without deforming the actual pouch. After being cut open, the cells were placed into a
vacuum hot plate for 72 hours at approximately 176 ◦F (80 ◦C) while at 27.0 inHg (91.4 kPa)
below ambient pressure. The intent of the lower the pressure and the raised temperature
was to promote evaporation of the electrolyte.
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Figure 4.1: Mass Loss of Electrolyte from Dried Pouch Cells
Figure 4.1 above shows the total mass loss for both the 500 mAh and 800 mAh cells
over time. The initial average mass of the 500 mAh cells was 10.08 grams and the 800 mAh
cells had an initial mass of 16.95 grams. Over the 72 hours of drying, the 500 mAh cells
lost an average of 1.06 grams and the 800 mAh cells lost an average of 1.58 grams. Based
on the trends, might be a small amount of electrolyte left in the cells. The 800 mAh cells
have a slightly steeper slope for the last data points than the 500 mAh cells. With the
bigger pouch, more time may have been required to ensure the electrolyte in the cell was
completely evaporated. This would need to be further investigated.
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Figure 4.2: Dried Out Cells in Standard Sample Holder
Figure 4.2 above shows a 500 mAh cell that has been cut open and dried for
approximately 72 hours. The standard sample holder is used along with kaowool to set
the sample at 25.4 mm below the conical heater.
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Figure 4.3: Dried Out Cell Cut Edge
Figure 4.3 shows an additional view of the dried-out cell, this time moved such that
the cut open end can be seen. The end was frayed or spread open of the pouch after being
sliced, along with the green tape holding the separation material together was cut. Once the
pouch was sliced open, the end of the razor blade was used to help spread apart as much
as possible without causing damage or tears. This step was to help promote additional
evaporation of the electrolyte.
The third set of tests consisted of 500 mAh and 800 mAh array tests. The arrays
consisted of a total of five pouch cells stacked on top of one another with type K thermocouples
placed in between each cell. The size of the thermocouple wire used was 36 gauge. The
small size of the thermocouple would affect the contact between each cell the least. This
provided the temperature data and determined is used to determine the failure temperature
effects between each cell. The test by Larsson et al. (122) performed a similar test in order
to gain an understanding of HRR and modeling of a five-pouch cell array. The difference,
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as mentioned in the literature review was that a propane burner was set underneath of
the array rather than a conical heater set a specified heat flux. The HRR depends on the
thermal thickness of the material. A thin material will see a large spike in the HRR whereas
a thick material will see more of a steady-state or plateaued HRR (127). This gives the
reason between understanding how a single pouch cell which is thin verse an array of cells
which is thick might give different characterizations.
For the array tests, a custom ASTM E1354 sample holder was built. This was to help
prevent gases and contents from ejecting from the sample tray. The with the potential of
venting due to a small rupture in the pouch of the cell, contents could potentially be pushed
outside of the air flow and not become entrapped and pulled into the exhaust stream. The
height of the sample holder was set to stay below the shudders below the conical heater.
Kaowool was used to set the top cell at nominally 1” or 25.4 mm below the base of the conical
heater. Stainless steel was used, and the dimensions of the custom sample tray matched the
ASTM E1354 sample tray. Vents were added at the bottom to prevent stagnation of fuel
within the sample tray since the edges are higher than the standard sample tray. The FAA
test by Quintiere et al. (118) modified a sample tray for 18650 cells and provided ventilation
holes in a similar matter. The sample tray was sandblasted to prevent reflections of the
heat flux from affecting the cells B through E.
103
Figure 4.4: Side View of Custom Battery Array Sample Holder
Figure 4.4 shows the side view of the custom sample tray on the left and the standard
sample tray on the right. The custom sample tray was fabricated using waterjet cutting
and sheet metal bending techniques. The sides of the box were TIG welded together. At
the bottom of the custom sample tray, four 0.25” (6.35 mm) holes are just above the crease
in the material. All four sides have these ventilation holes.
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Figure 4.5: Top View of Custom Battery Array Sample Holder
Figure 4.5 shows the top view of the custom sample tray on the left and the standard
sample tray on the right. The dimensions are nominally the same, and as noted above, the
custom sample holder is taller than the standard sample holder with the optional shroud.
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Figure 4.6: Pre-Burn View of 500 mAh Array
Figure 4.6 shows the 500 mAh array prior to testing. Note that the tabs are pointed
to the end opposite of the handle and the array is centered in the sample tray. This again
is to help ignite the cells with the standard ignitor on the cone calorimeter due to the first
off-gassing occurring near the tabs/taped the end of the cells. Two separate sections of
safety wire were used, both going underneath and tied together in the center of the cell.
One piece along the lateral direction and the other along the longitudinal direction. This
is similar to how Larsson et al. fastened pouch arrays together.
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Figure 4.7: PMMA Array Test
In addition to battery arrays, an array using 3/16” thick Poly(methyl methacrylate)
or PMMA with a metalized moisture resistant polyester film was used to help further
characterize the array tests. This metal film has a silver reflective aluminum finish coating
and is made from polyester. The array is shown in figure 4.7, with five sheets of PMMA
stacked with the polyester film in between.
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Figure 4.8: PMMA Array Test with Foil
Figure 4.8 shows how the sample was prepared, with a foil tray around it and the
standard sample holder was used. The top of the array was set at nominally 25.4 mm below
the conical heater. The intent of this additional test was to help show the effect of a layered
medium, characterizing how the PMMA burns with a layer of film in between should show
how the different individual samples of PMMA burn over the test period.
4.4 Test Observations
The first set of tests were single cells tests. A total of six samples, three 500 mAh
and three 800 mAh, were used at 0% SOC. The cone calorimeter was calibrated, and the
conical heater was set at nominally 50 kW/m2. Once ready, the sample holder and one thin
sheet of kaowool would be prepped. Right before starting the test, the cell would be placed
on the fresh sheet of kaowool. The thought was that some of the gases ejected from the
other cells might absorb into the kaowool, so a fresh top sheet would prevent any leftover
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contents from burning in the next test. The sample holder would then be inserted under
the conical heater and the igniter would be placed above the tab area of the cell.
Figure 4.9: Burning View of 800 mAh Single Cell Jetting
During testing, it was noted that the single cells at 0% SOC would begin to off-gas
around the tab and taped side of the cell. Some swelling would occur in the pouch, followed
by a rupture on the end of the cell with the tabs. This would cause some type of jetting
effect, where gasses would expel from that end for a short period. This is seen in figure 4.9.
It was noted that the jetting was not violent enough to eject any contents or gases that
were noticed outside of the airstream pulling into the exhaust hood. This jetting effect was
also noted by Ping (121) when testing prismatic cells at 0% SOC.
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Figure 4.10: Burning View of 800 mAh Single Cell Post Jetting
Once the jetting effect diminished, the rest of the cell would begin to burn, with the
whole pouch at this point burning. This is shown in figure 4.10, with the entire pouch at
this point burning and the jetting on the tab end of the cell slowing to a stop.
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Figure 4.11: Burning View of 800 mAh Single Cell Extinguished
After the flame extinguished, the sample would sit under the conical heater for two
minutes before the test ended. It was observed that the remaining components of the cell
would begin to swell and glow orange.
The second set of tests were single cells tests. A total of six samples, three 500 mAh
and three 800 mAh, were used at 0% SOC and slit open and dried out as shown in figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.12: Burning View of 800 mAh Dried Cell
The dried cells burned differently compared to the cells with the electrolyte. While
the end with the tabs would be the first point to ignite, the entire pouch would quickly
begin burning. No jetting effect was observed with the dried cells. The burning of the dried
cells looked like the post-jetting burning effect from the cells with the electrolyte.
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Figure 4.13: Burning View of 500 mAh Array
Figure 4.13 shows the 500 mAh array during the test. As stated previously, the tabs
are located on the opposite end of the handle. The thermocouples were held up with safety
wire to prevent unnecessary tension, though due to the thermocouple wires, mass data will
have a larger uncertainty.
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Figure 4.14: Burning View of 800 mAh Array
Figure 4.14 shows a close-up view of the 800 mAh cell array test burning. These tests
were like that of the single cells at 0% SOC, with the first cell failing in the same matter. The
difference was that the modified sample holder would help deflect the vent gases straight
up. With the raised sample holder, it was more difficult to make observations. While
the testing was conducted, it was observed with the Graphtec Data Logger that as the
thermocouple measuring the temperature of the top surface of any given cell approached
170 ◦C, the temperature would suddenly be starting elevating quicker. On the third test
using the 800 mAh cells, the fire self-extinguished a few seconds after ignition. The cause
of this may have been due to vent gasses accumulating inside of the sample holder, causing
a rich condition. The ignitor was re-positioned immediately, and ignition reoccurred. Even
with the additional ventilation holes along the bottom of the custom sample holder, there
may have been some stagnation inside of the box causing this rich condition.
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Figure 4.15: PMMA Array Test Burning
The PMMA tests were unique in the sense that there was a time delay between each
layer. The first test had a long time to ignition compared to the second and third. The top
layer of separation material protected the first piece of PMMA from burning before finally
off-gassing and burning. The complete array took roughly twenty minutes from ignition to
being extinguished. Five very distinct peaks were shown in the data and can be seen in the
results section below.
4.5 Cone Calorimetry Testing Results
In chapter three, various metrics such as lower flammability limit, flame speed, and
overpressure were characterized for lithium-ion cells in order to compare with other similar
deflagration hazards. To characterize the fire hazard and fuel load of Li-BESS quantitatively,
the HRR can be measured compared with other hazards. With the pouch cells used in these
tests and other literature have various cross-sectional areas and thicknesses. Analyzing the
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HRR with units of kW and kW/m3 will give the ability to compare results and trends with
other pouch cells with different dimensions. Additionally, this will help quantify the fuel
load of lithium-ion cells on a volume basis.
The data for times to ignition, flame extinction time, time to peak HRR, the mean
HRR, THR along with the mass data will be presented with uncertainty analysis for all tests.
With these exploratory experiments to determine the HRR of various cells and arrays, each
test had three sets of data collected. This will give a baseline for what should be expected
with uncertainty. By using the standard deviation and the student t-value, an uncertainty








The standard deviation is calculated for a sample based on equation 4.5 above.
Looking up the critical value for the Student’s t Distribution based on the significance level,
α, and degrees of freedom, ν. Based on standard practice, a confidence interval of 95% will
be used. The degrees of freedom is based on ν=n-1, so ν=2. Using the two-tailed test, with
ν=2 and α=0.05/2, looking up t1-α,ν which a t-value of 4.303 (128). Using this gives a large
uncertainty based on the sample size being so small. As part of this exploratory method,
additional testing in future work would need to be performed to further understand the
uncertainty. Using this, the 95% confidence interval can be calculated from the following:




Using equation 4.6, the range of uncertainty with 95% confidence can be estimated
for each different measurement and presented. The various tables will include the mean


















































































Figure 4.16: Preliminary Single Cell Cone Calorimeter Tests
Figure 4.16 shows the initial HRRs for the various cells tested initially. Note that
the 1500 mAh dried cell was damaged during the drying process where a cut in the center
of the pouch occurred. It was still burned to characterize how it may have changed and
based on the third hump; this might be due to that damage. There is a large peak in the
0% SOC cells followed by one smaller peaked later in the burning process. The dried cells
have a smaller initial peak followed by a second peak around the same magnitude as the
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second peak on the 0% SOC cells. This was a good baseline to compare various cells and
the characteristics are very similar, though also unique compared to other tests in a cone
calorimeter.
Figure 4.17: Post-Burn of 800 mAh Single Cell
figure 4.17 shows a single 800 mAh cell after it was removed from the cone calorimeter.
It is still glowing at the bottom. What is left is mainly the tabs, cathode and anode
materials, with the pouch mostly burned away. The silver flakes on top of the cell are the
aluminum material that was used to construct the pouch cell.
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Figure 4.18: HRR Data for 500 mAh Cell Tests
The 500 mAh single cell tests established a general trend where there is a large
initial peak after ignition, with a more plateaued HRR followed by one last smaller peak
before the flame extinguishes. The small oscillations in the data are based on the area size
being much smaller than the typical test sample. This is from the equipment and how it is
measuring the HRR.
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Test 1 26 132 32 597.05 392.78 41.63 10.06 4.03
Test 2 13 130 30 776.53 410.33 48.01 10.08 1.85
Test 3 24 134 38 963.24 449.11 49.40 10.24 2.08
Mean 21 132 33.33 778.94 417.41 46.35 10.13 2.65
Std. Dev. 7.0 2.0 4.2 183.10 28.83 4.14 0.10 1.20
Uncertainty (±) 17 5 10 454.89 71.61 10.29 0.24 2.99
Table 4.3 gives the test ignition time, test time, peak HRR, mean HRR, total energy,
and mass loss data for the single cells. The time to the peak HRR is consistent at an average
of 33 seconds. Looking at the mean peak release, the third test has a much higher peak
heat release, yet the mean HRR is a lot closer when comparing each test. The average total
heat release is consistent at 46.35 kJ.
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Figure 4.19: HRR Data for 800 mAh Cell Tests
The 800 mAh single cell tests have very similar HRR curves for the first and second
test, yet the third test has the same overall shape, put over a shorter time. The first and
second peaks are higher than those of the other two tests.
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Test 1 24 160 34 888.48 484.81 65.93 16.89 3.67
Test 2 14 151 29 1148.01 509.09 69.75 16.92 3.82
Test 3 19 121 35 1567.34 675.80 68.93 16.94 5.16
Mean 19 144 33 1201.28 556.57 68.20 16.92 4.22
Std. Dev. 5 20 3 342.55 103.97 2.01 0.03 0.82
Uncertainty (±) 12 51 8 851.01 258.29 4.99 0.07 2.04
As shown in table 4.4, the third test has a peak HRR of 1567.34 W, much higher than
test one and two. The time to the peak HRR is very close among each cell, at 33 seconds.
Even with the higher peaks, all three tests have very close overall total heat release, with
an average of 68.2 kJ.
Looking at the literature of similar tests, the paper by Somandepalli et al. (117) has
very similar results for pouch cells at 0% SOC. There is an initial peak after ignition followed
by a small peak before extinguishing. Observing their post-burn images shows more of a
roll or folded up type cell construction, whereas the cells used in these experiments appear
to be stacked rather than folded.
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Figure 4.20: Post-Burn of 800 mAh Dried Cell
The next set of tests discussed will be the dried-out cells. Figure 4.20 is a dried out
800 mAh cell after it was removed from the cone calorimeter. The post-burning images are
very similar to the 0% SOC cell as shown in figure 4.17, yet the data is a lot different.
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Figure 4.21: HRR Data for 500 mAh Dried Cell Tests
The 500 mAh dried cells have a much different overall trend than that of the 0% SOC
cells. Rather than the major peak initially happening, there is one small peak, followed by
a larger peak before the flame extinguished. All three tests have very similar trends with
no large difference between them.
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Test 1 62 134 97 635.05 382.36 27.53 9.04 0.97
Test 2 60 135 97 653.26 346.15 25.96 9.00 0.83
Test 3 67 141 112 617.11 328.65 24.32 9.04 0.88
Mean 63 137 102 635.14 352.39 25.94 9.02 0.89
Std. Dev. 4 4 9 18.07 27.40 1.61 0.02 0.07
Uncertainty (±) 9 9 22 44.90 68.06 3.99 0.06 0.18
The time for the peak HRR is 102 seconds. Total test times are also very close,
with an ignition time of 63 seconds and standard deviation of 4 seconds and a time to
extinguished of 137 with a standard deviation of 4 seconds. The peak HRR are also very
close at 635.14 W with a standard.
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Figure 4.22: HRR Data for 800 mAh Dried Cell Tests
As with the 500 mAh dried cells, the 800 mAh dried cells also have a similar small
peak followed by a large peak trend. The main difference noticed is that the first test has a
maximum HRR for the first peak that is higher than the other two tests. The first peak in
test one could be due to electrolyte still in the cell burning before the plastics making up
the pouch burns.
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Test 1 50 143 107 1006.62 450.27 41.87 15.30 3.08
Test 2 64 144 108 948.36 493.23 39.46 15.45 1.62
Test 3 52 151 118 905.87 434.61 43.03 15.41 2.08
Mean 55 146 111 953.62 459.37 41.45 15.39 2.26
Std. Dev. 8 4 6 50.58 30.35 1.82 0.08 0.75
Uncertainty (±) 19 11 15 125.66 75.41 4.52 0.19 1.86
The time for the peak HRR is 111 seconds with a standard deviation of 6 seconds.
Total test times are also very close, with an ignition time of 55 seconds and a standard
deviation of 8 seconds and a time to extinguished of 146 with a standard deviation of 4
seconds. The total heat release is very close, with an average of 41.45 kJ.
Compared with the 0% SOC tests, the dried-out cells seem to be a lot more repeatable
and have a lower overall deviation. The initial peak on the dried cells could be from a small
amount of electrolyte remaining within the cell even after the drying process. With the
jetting discussed earlier, this could have caused the variations in the HRR. The overall
THR is very repeatable for all the tests so far. The HRR is less repeatable from test to
test. This shows how much the lithium-ion cells have variations from cell to cell. By using
the dry cell data and data at 0% SOC, comparison of the effect of the electrolyte can be
determined. Additionally, the heat of combustion for the electrolyte can be estimated based
on the difference in THR and the dried cell mass loss data.
The mass loss data is also an example of why more tests should be performed to
better understand if some of the tests are outliers and why. Also, the load cell has a range
of 0 to 275 grams, with the burning mass is less than 10 grams, might cause additional
uncertainty. Additionally, this motivated the need to test cell arrays. The effect from
individual cell variations should be reduced and have less of an effect when in a multi-cell
array.
The next set of tests are the array tests. These involved five cells stacked inside
of the custom sample holder with thermocouples on each surface of each cell. Figure 4.24
should be referred to for the thermocouple locations.
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Figure 4.23: Post-Burn of 500 mAh Array
Figure 4.23 above shows the 500 mAh array test after the test was completed and
it was removed from the cone calorimeter. The cells remained intact with the safety
wire wrapped around them. It should be noted even the bottom cell is glowing, showing
propagation through the whole array.
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Figure 4.24: Five Cell Array Setup
Figure 4.24 above shows a diagram for how the array test was set up. Cells A-E
were stacked, and safety wired together.
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Figure 4.25: HRR Data for 500 mAh Array Tests
Unlike the single cell tests, the array tests are a lot more interesting and less
predictable as shown in figure 4.25. The first test has eight very distinct peaks through
the test. The second test had a total of six distinct peaks, though the second and third
are a lot wider than the others. The third test has six distinct peaks, with the first peak
being significantly larger than the others. The larger peaks on the second and third test
have similar magnitudes and the last three to four peaks have very similar magnitudes and
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shapes. The last three to four peaks prior to extinguishing have very similar characteristics
and magnitudes.













Test 1 29 428 179 1209.71 628.04 250.59
Test 2 35 354 103 1343.34 772.87 246.55
Test 3 41 349 107 1467.28 849.46 261.63
Mean 35 377 130 1340.11 750.12 252.92
Std. Dev. 6 44 43 128.82 112.45 7.81
Uncertainty (±) 15 110 106 320.02 279.35 19.40
With the first array tests, the deviations are a lot higher than that of the single cells
tests as seen in table 4.7. Yet the total heat release has an average of 252.92 kJ. Taking
the average of the heat release and dividing it by five gives a value of 50.58 kJ compared to
the 46.35 kJ for the average single 500 mAh cell heat release. This shows that all five cells
were completely burned when comparing with the single cell tests. The ignition time is on
average 35 seconds compared to the 21 seconds it took for the single cells tests, this could
be due to the thickness of the array effecting this.
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Figure 4.26: HRR Data for 500 mAh Array with Temperature Data
The temperature profiles in figure 4.26 are very similar. Thermocouple A has a
temperature of about 350 ◦C when ignition occurs. This is relatively consistent with all the
tests. From there, the temperatures all gradually rise with various slopes to about 650 ◦C
where they suddenly ramp up to 850 ◦C, after the sample is completely burnt.
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Figure 4.27: Post-Burn of 800 mAh Array
Figure 4.27 above shows the 800 mAh array test after the test was completed and
it was removed from the cone calorimeter. Like the 500 mAh arrays, the cells stay intact,
and all the cells appear glowing the same.
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Figure 4.28: HRR Data for 800 mAh Array Tests
Figure 4.28 gives the HRR curves for the 800 mAh arrays. Like the 500 mAh arrays,
these are a lot more complex than that of the single cell tests. The first test has six distinct
peaks, with one very large peak at 180 seconds or so. Test two has eight different peaks,
with one large test at about 150 seconds. The third test has six peaks, with one large peak
at about 180 seconds. It should be noted the small peak very close to the initial time of
ignition was due to the flame extinguishing just after initial ignition, where the igniter was
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used to reignite the cells. This again as previously mentioned may have been due to the
venting of the cells causing a rich mixture inside of the custom sample holder causing the
flame to extinguish. The final peaks in all the tests have very similar characteristics, with
the first and third tests having final peaks that are shaped nearly identically.













Test 1 23 441 176 1791.21 858.30 358.77
Test 2 24 562 145 1213.46 663.42 356.92
Test 3 45 423 186 1590.49 853.05 322.45
Mean 31 475 169 1531.72 791.59 346.05
Std. Dev. 12 76 21 293.32 111.03 20.45
Uncertainty (±) 31 188 53 728.72 275.84 50.82
Shown in table 4.8 gives an average heat release of 346.05 kJ. The same approach
as with the 500 mAh arrays, taking the THR over five gives 69.21 kJ compared with the
average heat release of 68.20 kJ from the single cell data. The average ignition time and
time to extinguish for the single 800 mAh cells is 19 seconds and 144 seconds, 31 seconds
and 475 seconds for the array.
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Figure 4.29: HRR Data for 800 mAh Array with Temperature Data
The temperature data for the 800 mAh cells as shown in figure 4.29 gives similar
temperature profiles to that of the 500 mAh cells. During test one and two, the thermocouple
on the top cell was detached. This caused the readings to be of the gases only and was
removed in the figure above once this occurred. The other thermocouples had a similar
general trend as with the 500 mAh arrays, with a rising slope to about 500 ◦C then a
sudden jump up as the flame extinguished once the thermocouple F reached 800 ◦C.
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Comparing to the literature, the paper by Larsson at al. (122) gives an example of
a 0% SOC five cell array burning. The effects are almost mirrored, with the smaller peaks
in the first half of the HRR and the larger peaks coming prior to the flame extinguishing.
Figure 4.30: PMMA Array Test Post Burn
The final set of tests consisted of the five stacked arrays of PMMA samples with
metalized moisture resistant polyester film in between each face. Even with the film in
between each sample, each of the samples still completely burned, as evident in figure 4.30.
Additional photos of the testing will be placed in Appendix B.
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Figure 4.31: HRR Data for PMMA Array Tests
The figure above, 4.31, shows how the PMMA array burns with the film in between
each piece. Test one and three have very similar peaks and dips with the same 6 to 8 kW
range. the second test is almost more dampened out when comparing with the other two
tests.
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Test 1 517 1687 662 7945.91 5548.79 6492.09 267.85 269.81
Test 2 155 1354 317 7555.62 5415.75 6493.49 267.22 269.42
Test 3 352 1490 1330 7914.52 5692.79 6462.01 264.25 266.40
Mean 341 1510 770 7805.35 5552.44 6482.53 266.44 268.55
Std. Dev. 181 167 515 216.84 138.55 17.78 1.92 1.87
Uncertainty (±) 450 416 1279 538.70 344.22 44.17 4.78 4.63
Table 4.9 gives the overall data for the PMMA arrays. The peak HRR average is
7805.35 W and the mean HRR is 5552.44 W and an average total heat release of 6482.53
kJ. The mass data shows there is an error between the scale used to measure the total mass
compared to the load cell on the cone calorimeter.


























Table 4.10 shows the data for the total heat release for the single cell tests and five
times the total heat release. This should help determine if the individual cell data matches
with the array tests.























As mentioned before, comparing one-fifth of the total heat release in table 4.11, the
500 mAh array gives 50.58 kJ compared to 46.35 kJ for the single cell average. The 800
mAh array gives a value of 69.21 kJ compared to 68.20 kJ for the single cells shown in
table 4.10. Both the 500 mAh and 800 mAh data aligns showing that both arrays were
completely burned.
In order to further quantify the results from the lithium-ion cells, numerical integration
was used to compute the THR over time. The results can be found below in figures 4.32 and
4.33. Based on the tables above, all five cells did burn when comparing the THR with the
array to the THR of the single cells. Unlike the PMMA array test with five distinct peaks,
the pouch cells have varying peaks and trends. This could be due to the different materials
throughout the cell burning at different rates, causing some of the variations in peaks. This
causes the burning of each cell to overlap, unlike the PMMA array which distinctly would
have the top piece burn before the next.
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Figure 4.32: Total Heat Release Over Time 500 mAh Array
Looking at the THR in figure 4.32 shows very linear trends directly after ignition.
As the array extinguishes, the THR begins to plateau, an indication that the sample is
completely burnt. This shows as the HRR drops down and plateaus at the same time as the
THR. Based on table 4.11, the average THR for a single 500 mAh cell is 46.35 kJ. Taking
this into account, the table below shows the times that the THR for the array equals one,
two, three, four and all five cells.
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1/5 of Total Heat
Released (s)
2/5 of Total Heat
Released (s)
3/5 of Total Heat
Released (s)





Test 1 50.118 100 167 221 305 422
Test 2 49.309 94 141 199 263 352
Test 3 52.327 100 143 203 265 343
Average 50.585 98 150 208 278 372
Std. Dev. 1.562 3 14 12 24 43
Table 4.12 shows the time it takes for the THR to equal fifth increments of the total
array heat release. This shows how long each array took to burn each battery. The 500
mAh cells burnt about 111 seconds on average from ignition to extinguishing. It only takes
an average of 63 seconds to get to 1/5th of the THR, or approximately one battery. With
perhaps the second battery starting to burn the reason behind the array having a quicker
time to a single cell this shows some of the reason behind the HRR data being so different
between tests for the first 200 seconds or so. Then it takes an additional 52 and 58 seconds
to achieve 2/5th and 3/5th of the THR. To reach 4/5th and the complete burn of the array,
it takes an average of 70 and 94 seconds longer. This all sums up to an average of 335
seconds from ignition to being extinguished to burn the complete array using an average
ignition time of 35 seconds. The single cell takes 111 seconds, with the array test using
500 mAh cells taking three times as long. The cells are not burning individually like the
PMMA, but rather they are burning at a quicker rate, with various materials within the cell
such as the electrolyte burning quickly as seen in the first 200 seconds, then more distinct
and repeatable components burning, shown in the last half of the HRR curves.
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Figure 4.33: Total Heat Release Over Time 800 mAh Array
A similar comparison can be made with the 800 mAh array test. Figure 4.33 above
gives the same linear trend for the THR over time as the 500 mAh array did. Again, as
expected, when the sample is extinguished, the THR and the HRR both plateau.
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1/5 of Total Heat
Released (s)
2/5 of Total Heat
Released (s)
3/5 of Total Heat
Released (s)





Test 1 71.754 121 176 231 309 434
Test 2 71.384 124 192 271 376 552
Test 3 64.490 155 200 251 316 414
Average 69.209 133 189 251 334 467
Std. Dev. 4.091 19 12 20 37 75
It takes an average time of 31 seconds for the 800 mAh arrays to ignite. Table 4.13
gives an average time to reach 1/5th of the THR at 133 seconds or 102 seconds after ignition,
compared to 125 seconds from ignition for a single 800 mAh cell to extinguish. It then takes
56 and 62 more seconds to reach 2/5th and 3/5th of the THR. To reach 4/5th and the THR
in the array test it takes an additional 83 and 133 seconds. Like the 500 mAh array test, to
reach the last 2/5th of the THR, it takes a lot more time than the first 3/5th of the THR.
This again shows how unlike separated medians of the same material; the cells are a lot
more complex in terms of how they burn and what the effect of an array burning compared
to single cell data is.
4.5.1 Discussion of Results
The single cell tests were overall repeatable, with some differences on the magnitudes
of the first peak for the HRR. The dried-out cells were a lot more repeatable, with the HRR
plots having very similar peaks in terms of shape and magnitude when comparing both
the 500 mAh and 800 mAh cells. The array tests can be explained when first looking
at the PMMA arrays. The tests showed that with an interface in between the layers of
PMMA, there is a dampening effect as the top layer burns prior to the next layer. With
the pouch cells, there are more materials used with the casing, cathode, anode, separator,
and electrolyte. Once the PMMA array burns through the separating material, it burns
like a single PMMA material. The peak HRR per area is an average of 780.54 kW/m2.
Looking at the results from Lindholm at al. (115) gives a peak of about 900 kW/m2 and
has a similar HRR curve for samples with various thickness values. The lower peak HRR
could be due to heat flux, variations in samples, or a dampening effect from the separating
material. The lithium-ion cells have more layers and variations in how each material burns.
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This is apparent from the single cells tests that each has two peaks in the HRR curve, in
contrast to the one single peak a material such as PMMA has. The cells are layered, with
a pouch on the outside like that of the separating material used in the PMMA array test.
But there is also the electrolyte and the fact that the pouch is sealed. This causes the
off-gassing effect, that has been noted and shown in figure 4.9. The jetting effects are noted
and believed to be captured in the first half or so of the HRR for the array tests. This is
based on observation from the single cell tests and how the first half of the HRR curves
vary with the arrays tests, where the last half of the data is a lot more repeatable.
Since the lithium-ion pouch cells are sealed, this has an effect on the results when
burning. The point where the pouch ruptures and the heated gases eject and burn clearly
varies more than the rest of the cell burning. The study by Zhang et al. (129) compares
the HRR curves of various electrolyte mixtures. There is a large variation in the HRR
curves, with some electrolyte mixtures having single peaks, other having multiple peaks.
This can explain how both the array tests and how the single cell tests have such different
characteristics to the dried cells. As observed and discussed, the electrolyte has a large
effect on the overall HRR curves.
4.6 Understanding Lithium-ion Cells as a Commodity
As mentioned, with this data, the intent is to quantify and understand the metrics
associated with the fire hazard and fuel load. There is a large amount of literature review
that shows studies of the HRR and THR for both bench scale and large-scale testing of
various commodities from bulk storage to standard living spaces. As listed before, NFPA
13 gives a list that describes the various classes of commodities and how to size sprinkler
systems for each class. With increasing fuel, there is an increase in total sprinkler coverage
and flow rates. To better understand the total fuel load of lithium-ion cells, tables with the






The heat of combustion given in equation 4.7 gives the total change in enthalpy per
volume of fuel reacted (87). The units of the heat of combustion is typical MJ/kgF,r or
kJ/gF,r.






Test 1 269.81 6492.09 24.06
Test 2 269.42 6493.49 24.10
Test 3 266.40 6462.01 24.26
Mean 268.55 6482.53 24.14
Std. Dev. 1.87 17.78 0.10
Uncertainty (±) 4.63 44.17 0.26
The testing for the five-sample array of PMMA gave a total mass loss of an average
of 268.55 grams and a total heat release of 6483 kJ shown in table 4.14. This gives a
∆hc calculated in this experiment of 24.14 kJ/gF,r compared to the literature value of 24.2
kJ/gF,r. This same approach can be used in conjunction with lithium-ion cell testing.
Since the mass data for the array testing has a large error due to the thermocouple
wires pulling down. The single cell data can be used to determine the heat of combustion
for the single cells, and then scaled to the five-cell array. The values compared with the
THR from the test data.
Table 4.15: 500 mAh Single Cell Heat of Combustion





Test 1 10.06 4.03 41.63 10.32
Test 2 10.08 1.85 48.01 26.02
Test 3 10.24 2.08 49.40 23.80
Mean 10.13 2.65 46.35 20.05
Std. Dev. 0.10 1.20 4.14 8.49
Uncertainty (±) 0.24 2.99 10.29 21.10
Taking the single cell mass loss for the 500 mAh cells and the THR in table 4.15
gives an average heat of combustion of 20.05 kJ/g. Note that test one has a lot more mass
loss than two and three. This is again due to the uncertainty in the mass loss data as
previously discussed.
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Table 4.16: 800 mAh Single Cell Heat of Combustion





Test 1 16.89 3.67 65.93 17.98
Test 2 16.92 3.82 69.75 18.25
Test 3 16.94 5.16 68.93 13.36
Mean 16.92 4.22 68.20 16.53
Std. Dev. 0.03 0.82 2.01 2.75
Uncertainty (±) 0.07 2.04 4.99 6.83
Using the same approach, single cell mass loss for the 800 mAh cells and the THR in
table 4.16 gives an average heat of combustion of 16.53 kJ/g. This is slightly lower than that
of the 500 mAh single cells. This could be due to more electrolyte or a different electrolyte
mixture associated with the 800 mAh cells. This needs to be further investigated, and the
dried cell tests and cell deconstruction below will help understand this.
Table 4.17: 500 mAh Dried Cell Heat of Combustion





Test 1 9.04 0.97 27.53 28.30
Test 2 9.00 0.83 25.96 31.16
Test 3 9.04 0.88 24.32 27.74
Mean 9.02 0.89 25.94 29.07
Std. Dev. 0.02 0.07 1.61 1.84
Uncertainty (±) 0.06 0.18 3.99 4.56
The dried cells have a heat of combustion that is actually higher than the non-dried
cells. Table 4.17 gives an average heat of combustion of 29.01 kJ/g. This value is along
the same magnitude of nylon (24.2 kJ/g) and polypropylene (30.8 kJ/g) (87). This makes
sense, as the only part burning should be the plastics that are left in the dried cell.
Table 4.18: 800 mAh Dried Cell Heat of Combustion





Test 1 15.30 3.08 41.87 13.59
Test 2 15.45 1.62 39.46 24.39
Test 3 15.41 2.08 43.03 20.73
Mean 15.39 2.26 41.45 19.57
Std. Dev. 0.08 0.75 1.82 5.49
Uncertainty (±) 0.19 1.86 4.52 13.65
Table 4.18 above gives the heat of combustion for the 800 mAh dried cells. The
average heat of combustion is 19.57 kJ/g, which is much lower than the 500 mAh dried
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cells. This might come from some of the electrolyte still being inside of the 800 mAh cell,
lowering this heat of combustion. This could be due to some of the electrolyte still left
inside of the cell, pulling the total heat of combustion down. This is apparent, as the heat
of combustion is lower for the electrolyte compared to plastics. The electrolyte should have
a heat of combustion ranging from 13.2 kJ/g to 20.9 kJ/g as measured by Zhang et al. (129).
This could explain the lower over all heat of combustion for the 800 mAh cell compared ot
the 500 mAh dried cells. Other dried cell tests would need to be performed in future work
to investigate this.




Heat of Combustion (kJ)
Calculated minus
Measured Total Heat Released (kJ)
Test 1 20.17 208.17 -44.75
Test 2 9.23 240.04 -12.88
Test 3 10.38 247.01 -5.91
Mean 13.26 231.74 -21.18
Using the heat of combustion and the mass loss data from the 500 mAh single tests,
the THR for a five cell s can be computed and compared to the measured array THR to
help verify the results in table 4.15. Since mass loss data for the array was not correct due
to the thermocouples, this drove using five times the single cell data. The average 500 mAh
array THR was subtracted from the computed THR to compare the difference. Based on
table 4.19, the computed THR in the array is very close to the measured, with an average
of 231.74 kJ compared to 252.92 kJ as measured with a difference of 21.18 kJ.




Heat of Combustion (kJ)
Calculated minus
Measured Total Heat Released (kJ)
Test 1 18.34 329.67 -16.38
Test 2 19.10 348.73 2.68
Test 3 25.80 344.66 -1.39
Mean 21.08 341.02 -5.03
Applying the same method for the 800 mAh array, the THR for the 800 mAh cells
can be computed and compared to the actual heat released to help verify the results in
table 4.16. Based on table 4.20, the computed THR in the array is again very close to
the measured, with an average of 341.02 kJ compared to 346.05 kJ as measured with a
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difference of 5.03 kJ. This shows based on the single cell heat of combustion that it can be
scaled to an array test and provide very close results.
4.6.1 Fuel Load on Volume Basis
To further develop an understanding of the fire hazard and fuel load for lithium-ion
pouch cells, using the HRR and THR per volume will be the next approach. This will give
the ability to compare bench-scale testing to larger scale fuel loads.







Test 1 100615.72 66191.50 7016.30
Test 2 130861.08 69148.19 8090.34
Test 3 162325.15 75684.63 8325.31
Mean 131267.32 70341.44 7810.65
Std. Dev. 30856.72 4857.75 697.89
Uncertainty (±) 76658.52 12068.29 1733.79
Normalizing the THR with the volume of the single 500 mAh cell gives an average
THR of 7811 MJ/m3 shown in table 4.21.







Test 1 101060.67 55144.74 7499.68
Test 2 130581.26 57907.00 7933.26
Test 3 178277.81 76868.62 7840.60
Mean 136639.92 63306.78 7757.85
Std. Dev. 38963.47 11825.82 228.33
Uncertainty (±) 96798.44 29379.34 567.24
Tables 4.21 and 4.22 gives the HRR and THR per unit volume from the single cell
data. The volume of single 500 mAh cell is 5.934e-6 m3 and the volume of a single 800 mAh
cell is 8.792e-6 m3. The total volume of the arrays is five times the single cell, with the 500
mAh array being 2.967e-5 m3 and the volume of the 800 mAh array is 4.396e-5 m3. The
average total heat release for the 500 mAh array is 253 kJ and for the 800 mAh array its
346 kJ per table 4.11. Using the range for the THR per volume given by the single cells, at
7758 to 7811 MJ/m3, this can be used to estimate the THR by multiplying the volume of
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the array and then comparing it with the measured THR.
This approach can also be used with the peak HRR and mean HRRs. Compared
with the 500 mAh cell data, the 800 mAh cells have a THR per volume of 7758 MJ/m3
per table 4.22. This data is only slightly different, by less than 100 MJ/m3. With the heat
of combustion, values have a larger variation between cells, the density of each cell can be
compared by referring to table 4.2. The 500 mAh cells have an average mass of 10.13 grams,
giving a density of 0.0017 grams/mm3. The 800 mAh cells have an average mass of 16.92
grams with a density of 0.0019 grams/mm3. With similar total heats released per volume,
but a large difference in the heat of combustion between the cells, this could be due to the
500 mAh cells being less dense but having about the same THR per volume.
To help further understand the fire hazard and the effect of electrolyte, the dried
cells have also been analyzed on a per volume basis.







Test 1 107018.67 64436.12 4639.40
Test 2 110087.26 58332.61 4374.95
Test 3 103995.50 55384.20 4098.43
Mean 107033.81 59384.31 4370.93
Std. Dev. 3045.91 4616.70 270.51
Uncertainty (±) 7567.07 11469.44 672.03
Table 4.23 shows the THR per volume for the 500 mAh dried cells. Comparing with
the cells at 0% SOC, the dried cells are nearly half, at 56% when comparing the averages.







Test 1 114498.46 51215.73 4763.06
Test 2 107870.96 56102.74 4488.22
Test 3 103038.79 49434.31 4894.00
Mean 108469.40 52250.93 4715.09
Std. Dev. 5753.23 3452.64 207.10
Uncertainty (±) 14292.96 8577.52 514.50
Table 4.24 shows the THR per volume for the 800 mAh dried cells. Comparing with
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the cells at 0% SOC, the dried cells are nearly half, at 61% when comparing the averages. So
overall, the electrolyte contributes a large amount to the THR. This shows the electrolyte
in the cell is leading to a large part of the total fuel load. It leads to a large peak in the
HRR initially, causing the total area under the HRR curve to be a lot larger.







Test 1 40772.04 21167.61 8445.88
Test 2 45275.92 26048.99 8309.63
Test 3 49453.30 28630.15 8818.09
Mean 45167.08 25282.25 8524.53
Std. Dev. 4341.65 3789.90 263.20
Uncertainty (±) 10786.13 9415.38 653.87
Additionally, the THR per volume can also be derived from the array tests and
again compared with the single cell data. Taking five times the volume of the single cell
and dividing the 500 mAh array peak HRR, mean HRR and THR can be seen in table 4.25.
The peak heat release for the 500 mAh array is 8525 MJ/m3 which is very similar to 500
mAh single cell data, with the average HRR per volume 7811 MJ/m3.







Test 1 40748.27 19525.62 8161.71
Test 2 27604.99 15092.09 8119.55
Test 3 36182.12 19406.02 7335.48
Mean 34845.12 18007.91 7872.24
Std. Dev. 6672.87 2525.88 465.33
Uncertainty (±) 16577.65 6275.14 1156.04
Again, using the same method with the 800 mAh array, the THR per volume is
7872 MJ/m3 per table 4.26. The range for the THR per volume is 7758 to 8525 MJ/m3
between the single cell and array tests. Using this method makes sense and shows by the




Breaking the cells down, the mass of each component used to construct the cell can
be determined. Comparing with other cells can help establish how different various cells
are and how that can affect the overall results.
Table 4.27: Cell Tear Down
500 mAh Mass Breakdown (grams)




4.53 3.24 0.68 0.13 0.53 9.11
800 mAh Mass Breakdown (grams)




7.86 5.48 1.14 0.18 0.92 15.57
Table 4.27 gives the mass of each major component in the 500 mAh and 800 mAh
cells. The cells were dried then sliced open along the sides. During the drying process, the
side opposite of the tabs was sliced open, as previously mentioned. From there the tabs,
package and tape were all removed in one piece, leaving the cathode, anode and separator
sheet together. The separator was peeled open and the cathode and anode pieces were kept
separate to determine the mass. As much of the loose carbon particulates were captured as
possible when tearing down the cells.




















Pouch 0.5 LCO 44.5 31.8 10.6 5.2 7.9 100.0
800 mAh
Cell
Pouch 0.8 LCO 45.7 31.9 9.4 5.3 7.7 100.0
Ribiere
(2012) (62)
Pouch 2.9 LMO 44.0 35.0 11.0 2.0 6.0 98.0
Somandepalli
(2014) (117)
Pouch 2.1 LCO 42.4 34.9 9.5 6.4 6.8 100.0
Golubkov
(2014) (72)
18650 2.6 LCO/NMC 45.1 24.8 10.4 2.7 16.9 100.0
Golubkov
(2014) (72)
18650 1.5 NMC 33.4 31.8 10.2 3.2 21.3 100.0
Golubkov
(2014) (72)
18650 1.1 LFP 30.3 23.3 16.4 3.1 26.9 100.0
Comparing the cell deconstruction results with other literature, the results are very
similar. Table 4.28 above shows the 500 mAh and 800 mAh cells are very similar in terms of
the overall constructions and mass fraction with the 2.9 Ah cells tore down by Ribiere et al.
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(62) and with Somandepalli et al. (117). The cells by Golubkov et al. (72) are cylindrical
rather than pouch cells with different chemistries.
The total heat release for the electrolyte can be determined from the difference in the
THR from the dried cell compared to the non-dried cell. The 500 mAh cell had a difference
of 20.41 kJ from the cell at 0% SOC to the dried cell. The average mass difference is 1.057
grams average across the three cells. Since the electrolyte for the specific cells is not specified
by the vendor in terms of the exact fractions of each initial electrolyte species, this can be
used to determine the overall heat of combustion. Taking the THR difference and dividing
by the mass difference gives ∆hC of 18.92 kJ/g. Taking the same approach for the 800 mAh
cells with a mass difference of 1.558 grams and a THR difference of 26.75 kJ, the total heat
of combustion for the electrolyte is 17.33 kJ/g. The calculated heat of combustion for the
electrolyte by Somandepalli et al. is 19.31 kJ/g. The heat of combustion for electrolytes
from Zhang et al. (129) is 13.2 kJ/g for EC, 20.9 kJ/g for DEC and 14.5 kJ/g for DMC.
The manufacturer does not break down the exact composition for the electrolyte, but it is
clear the measured value is of a mix of the various electrolytes.
Table 4.29: 500 mAh Cell Tear Down Heat Release Rate: Ideal ∆hc









Packaging (Inner) Polypropylene 42.66 0.22 9.59
Packaging (Outer) Nylon 28.76 0.22 6.46
Separator Polypropylene 42.66 0.53 22.40
Electrolyte EC:DEC:DMC 18.92 1.08 20.49
Computed Total Heat Released 58.94
Average Measured Total Heat: 46.35
Percent Difference (%): 21.36
To further understand how the cell burned, the total heat of combustion for each
material measured during the cell deconstruction was compared with the measured value.
Table 4.29 gives the breakdown of the combustible materials, the electrolyte, and the heat
of combustion values from Walters et al. (130). The separator is made from polypropylene,
which is straightforward to understand the THR. The packaging is a bit more complicated.
It is made from nylon, polypropylene and aluminum. It was assumed each material takes
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approximately 1/3 of the total mass of the packaging. With this assumption, the heat of
combustion from the computed THR compared to the measured is different, by just over
21% or 12.59 kJ. this could be due to some of the separator in the cell not completely
burning, a different actual mass fraction of the packaging, or just tolerance error from cell
to cell having slightly different mass fractions. Additionally, the heat of combustion for
the electrolyte will have some uncertainty, as the complete electrolyte may have not been
removed during the evaporation process.
Table 4.30: 800 mAh Cell Tear Down Heat Release Rate: Ideal ∆hc









Packaging (Inner) Polypropylene 42.66 0.38 16.11
Packaging (Outer) Nylon 28.76 0.38 10.86
Separator Polypropylene 42.66 0.92 39.08
Electrolyte EC:DEC:DMC 17.33 1.62 28.02
Computed Total Heat Released 94.06
Average Measured Total Heat: 68.20
Percent Difference (%): 27.49
The 800 mAh cell has a similar difference in the computed compared to measured
THR as shown in table 4.30. The difference is 27.49% or 25.86 kJ which is a bit more of a
difference than that 500 mAh comparison.
The percent error also could be so large due to the heat of combustion value not
being ideal. When burning, if only carbon dioxide and water form, it is ideal. Yet most
combustion processes are not quite ideal, as soot, carbon monoxide and other hydrocarbons
are found in the product side. This can be taken into account by using the actual verse the
ideal heat of combustion estimates for the different materials as shown below. The heat of
combustion values are from The Fundamentals of Fire Phenomena (87).
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Table 4.31: 500 mAh Cell Tear Down Heat Release Rate: Actual ∆hc









Packaging (Inner) Polypropylene 38.6 0.22 8.67
Packaging (Outer) Nylon 27.1 0.22 6.09
Separator Polypropylene 38.6 0.53 20.27
Electrolyte EC:DEC:DMC 18.92 1.08 20.49
Computed Total Heat Released 55.52
Average Measured Total Heat: 46.35
Percent Difference (%): 16.52
The error using the actual heat of combustion is only 16.52% as shown in table
4.31 for the 500 mAh cell comparison. This error is about 5% less than the ideal heat of
combustion case. This shows that the assumption of using 1/3 of the mass for the two
combustible materials in the packaging is a good assumption and the computed compared
to the measured values are very close.
Table 4.32: 800 mAh Cell Tear Down Heat Release Rate: Actual ∆hc









Packaging (Inner) Polypropylene 38.6 0.38 14.57
Packaging (Outer) Nylon 27.1 0.38 10.23
Separator Polypropylene 38.6 0.92 35.36
Electrolyte EC:DEC:DMC 17.33 1.62 28.02
Computed Total Heat Released 88.18
Average Measured Total Heat: 68.20
Percent Difference (%): 22.66
Again, the error for the 800 mAh cell using the actual heat of combustion values
is 22.66%. This is 5% or so less error than using the ideal heat of combustion. Further
deconstructions and comparison would be needed to better understand the material breakdown.
On such small cells, a small difference in the total measured mass of each component can
have a large difference in the THR.
It has been established that the packaging for LCO pouch cells is very similar. Even
with the 18650 formats, the packaging mass fraction is along with the same magnitude. The
heat of combustion for the various electrolyte chemistries is all close. Yet with the cylindrical
cell form factor, the different cathode chemistries have a lot different break down in terms
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of the mass of each material. With the test by Larsson et al. (122) consisting of a five-cell
array burning at 0% SOC, the THR per volume can be compared from the results with the
800 mAh and 500 mAh array. This can help further understand how the results vary.
At 0% SOC, the five cell LFP array had a THR of 8.314 MJ in the study by Larsson
et al. The nominal dimensions of each cell are 220 mm by 145 mm by 4.5 mm. This
gives a total volume of 1.44e-4 m3 per cell and an array volume of 7.18e-4 m3. Taking
the THR and dividing it by the total volume gives 11583 MJ/m3. This is higher than
the 8525 MJ/m3 for the 500 mAh array and 7872 MJ/m3 for the 800 mAh array. In the
deconstruction results by Somandepalli, the packaging materials, separator, and tapes are
made from chemicals compounds such as nylon, polypropylene, and polyester terephthalate.
The heat of combustion for these materials ranges from 28.76 kJ/g to 42.66 kJ/g per the
study by Walters et al. (130). With the 18650 LFP cell having a lot more packaging
material compared to the LCO/NMC cell, this might be similar in the pouch cells too. Yet
it should be noted the 18650 packaging has an aluminum casing rather than a plastic pouch.
The heat of combustion for the packaging materials involved is a lot higher than that of the
electrolytes, and this could cause the fire hazard for the LFP cells to be higher than that
of the LCO.
When understanding lithium-ion cells as a commodity, it is important to understand
the variations in different electrolytes, form factor type, and packaging to understand what
the fire hazard is. Additionally, the volume to area effect can change how much plastics
per volume there is in a single pouch cell. This will directly affect the fire load. Additional
analysis using the total cell energy in kWh will be in Appendix C.
4.7 Comparing with other Fuel Loads & Hazards
In chapter three, the vent gases from lithium-ion cells were compared with other
well-known flammable gases. This helped quantify the deflagration hazard of this vent gas
with well-known hazards. Using a similar comparison approach, understanding well-known
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commodities and referring to NFPA 13 can understand documented design guidance for
sprinkler systems. This will help give further understanding and guidance on how to protect
from lithium-ion cells in a stored commodity and additionally shed light on how to protect
Li-BESS. The following will give examples of various commodities defined in NFPA 13
Annex A:
1. Wood- Particle Board
2. Group B: Cellulosic Paper Products
3. Group A Expanded: Polystyrene
4. Group A Non-Expanded: Polypropylene
From NFPA 13 Annex A table A.5.3.1.1, the definitions of how the commodities
listed fit into a commodity class will help give a better understanding of each of these
fuel loads. Wood products, not in any containers are considered a class III, so the first
commodity is a stack of particle board. Taking the Group B plastic into account, a
non-containerized pallet of this is considered a class IV commodity. Group A plastics that
are exposed are considered either exposed expanded or non-expanded Group A plastics.
Lastly, a mixed group commodity of 25% by volume expanded, non-expanded group A
plastics, particle board and group B plastic will be used as well.
1. Class III: Exposed Wood- Particle Board
2. Class IV: Exposed Cellulosic Paper Products
3. Group A Exposed Expanded Plastic: Polystyrene
4. Group A Exposed Non-Expanded Plastic: Polypropylene
5. Mixed Group A Exposed: Polypropylene, Polystyrene, Cellulosic Paper Products, and
Particle Board
The example used to show how the lithium-ion cells compare with the commodities
listed above is by tabulating the THR from a 1 m3 cube of material. From there, design
criteria in NFPA 13 can give a better understanding for how to approach this commodity.
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Table 4.33 shows the various commodities and what the total fuel load for each
compared to the same volume of lithium-ion pouch cells. Based on table 5.6.3.3.3 in NFPA
13, with a mixed un-expanded volume fraction of 25% and an expanded group A plastic of
25%, the mixed commodity is considered a group A unexpanded commodity. The method







M i ∗Hu,i (4.8)
Equation 4.8 shows how the averaged heat of combustion for mix materials which
is based on the mass fraction of each individual material heat of combustion. The heat of
combustion values come from Structural Design for Fire Safety chapter three (131) and the
densities from the engineering toolbox (132). The fuel load for this mixed commodity is
very similar to the battery fuel load.
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The design guidelines are found in chapter 11-22 of NFPA 13 to determine the
sprinkler coverage requirements based on storage height and commodity type. Various
figures throughout NFPA 13 gives the total gallons per minute per square foot (GPM/ft2)
based on the coverage area of the sprinklers and the commodity classification. The assump-
tion here is solid piled commodities that are stored at ground level. Using an assumed
sprinkler coverage area of 3000 ft2 or 279 m2, according to NFPA 13 Ch. 13, the class
III and IV use the OH1 (Ordinary Hazard 1) design curve. This would give a sprinkler
density of 0.17 GPM/ft2. Continuing, the exposed group A plastics require a design curve
for OH1 design curve. For all these low piled commodities, use the same design curve and
in an area of sprinkler operation of 3000 ft2, this gives a flow of 510 GPM. As the storage
height increases, the different commodities require increasing sprinkler flow rates. When
class A plastics are stored at a height above five feet, the design jumps to the EH2 (Extra
Hazard 2) design curve. This requires a density of 0.38 GPM/ft2 or 1140 GPM. Compared
to the class III and IV, the OH1 design curve allows for a storage height of 12 feet for the
class II and 10 feet for the class IV. Per NFPA 13, the heat released for class I through
IV is considered moderate whereas group A plastics have a heat release to be considered
high. Based on table 4.33, the lithium-ion cells have a total heat release that is somewhere
between class III and group A expanded plastic at a 0% SOC.
The test by FM Global (59) compares lithium-ion batteries with unexpanded plastics
and class II commodities in terms of testing. Based on the packaging ratio, or fill density of
lithium-ion cells or batteries in a shipping box, for example, the commodity classification
could change. This is important to understand and can be used as a means to establish
guidance on sprinkler design. Additionally, at a low SOC, lithium-ion cells or batteries
similar to plastics in terms of the fuel load. The electrolyte, as determined from this study
and other literature, actually has a lower heat of combustion than the plastics constructing
the pouch cell. Establishing and ranking lithium-ion cells at low SOC as a commodity
has been done through this bench-scale testing, and the fuel loads for specific cases can be
computed using the data from these tests. Where the fire hazard associated with lithium-ion
cells becomes more challenging is when used in Li-BESS at higher SOC. The fuel load is
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understood at a low SOC, and as mentioned in chapter two, discharging during an error
state might make the system safer. At a SOC of 0%, the method to obtain the fuel load
has been outlined in this chapter. This can provide further development and quantitative




With the unique hazard associated with lithium-ion battery energy storage systems,
research and development are critical to understand and provide methodologies to safely
develop and integrate these systems. As the means to produce and use Li-BESS increase,
so will the potential consequences of failure. Previous emerging technologies have shown
this issue, with hot water boilers having multiple failure incidents prior to the formation of
codes and standards to provide safety guidance. This shows the absolute need to proactively
develop and enforce safety codes and standards rather than reacting to an incident before
safety becomes a focus. While the potential for lithium-ion cells to store energy is not
at all questioned, how to safely use these systems needs to be further understood. With
complex systems, failures can occur on many levels. In the case of Li-BESS, failures can
occur at a cell, module or rack level, within systems such as battery management, thermal
management, or with the quality control, design and use of the system. Understanding this
can help more effectively develop and write codes and standards for the safety community
to effectively manage and control Li-BESS installations.
The incidents in chapter two show that failure of lithium-ion cells occurs at all levels.
Small-scale consumer electronics such as phones, laptops, and e-cigarettes have numerous
reports and instances of failure. Transportation of lithium-ion cells has led to numerous
accidents while being transported by air, which has led the US FAA to ban air transportation
of bulk cells. Electric vehicle failures have led to fires that require a large amount of time
and resources from first responders. As more all-electric vehicles are produced, means of
protecting them from such volatile failures will need to be targeted. Large scale Li-BESS
have numerous failures which have led to fires and/or deflagration events. Yet these failures
are not captured in a centralized location, leading to speculation and assumptions on the
causes and consequences.
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Research of the failures at a cell level has been performed for over twenty years.
This data needs to be utilized to provide guidance and design criteria for safer Li-BESS.
Numerous experiments have shown the breakdown of the gas species that are vented during
failure of a lithium-ion cell. When venting, the various cathode chemistries produce similar
species compositions. The vent gas contains carbon-dioxide, carbon monoxide, hydrogen,
and various hydro- carbons. The quantity of each species varies by the cathode chemistry
and state of charge. Taking these different flammable gas mixtures, models created with
Cantera were used to estimate the lower flammability limit, laminar flame speed, and
maximum overpressure shown in chapter three. These metrics help understand and characte-
rize the explosion hazard associated with lithium-ion cells. Known explosion hazards such
as methane, hydrogen, propane and combustible dusts have been researched and safety
practices have been established using standards such as NFPA 68 and 69. By applying the
prescribed guidance to size deflagration vents and using the models for flame speed and
maximum overpressure, a means to further characterize the hazard of lithium-ion cells was
further established. The vent gas explosion metrics have a similar magnitude as class 1-3
dusts, propane, methane, and even hydrogen.
Using the modeled laminar flame speed and overpressure with the prescribed method
in NFPA 68 to size deflagration vents further helped rank lithium-ion cell vent gas with
known explosion hazards. What was concluded from this study was that the LFP cathode
chemistry has a lower hazard compared to LCO and NCA at 100% SOC. Additionally,
guidance on how to apply NFPA 68 can help the safety community verify their own safety
systems. This method of using the vent gas model results with a well-known prescribed
standard such as NFPA 68 helps understand and rank Li-BESS vent gas with other well-known
hazards. The benefit of the models and methodologies provided in chapter three is they are
all open source and can be used by other members of the safety community.
In addition to the deflagration and explosion hazards which are associated with
lithium-ion cells and Li-BESS, the fire hazard and fuel loads were researched. Testing using
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a bench-scale oxygen consumption cone calorimeter measured the products of burning cells,
dried cells, and arrays at 0% SOC. As discussed in chapter four, LCO cells produce oxygen
at a high state of charge when burning due to the electrolyte reactions. At a low state of
charge, this oxygen production significantly reduces. Testing was done for nominally 0%
SOC LCO pouch cells to prevent uncertainties from this oxygen production. The intent
of the single cell and array studies was to help further development and understanding of
lithium-ion cells and help characterize how the associated fuel load.
Key metrics in fire hazards are the heat release rate, total heat released, the heat
of combustion and mass loss. Through these metrics, analysis and comparison of the fuel
load between all three tests were performed. The total heat released for the dried cell is
about 30% to 40% less than the non-dried cells. A five cell array was also burnt and the
results analyzed. The data when normalized by the volume of the array gives a total heat
release per volume of 7800 to 8500 MJ/m3. The single cells give a range from 7700 to 7800
MJ/m3. This shows that the single cell data scales up with the five cell array on a volume
basis. Additionally, the PMMA array was tested to draw further conclusions of the effects
of burning separated layers of the same material.
The heat of combustion for the electrolyte was calculated through the difference in
the total heat released and mass for the dried verse non-dried cells. The total heat released
for the dried cells might be less than the non-dried cells, but the heat of combustion is
actually larger. This is due to the electrolyte having a lower heat of combustion than the
plastics constructing the cell. Single cells were deconstructed in order to determine the mass
of each component constructing the pouch cell. Using the individual heat of combustion
values from the literature, the computed total heat released from the deconstruction was
established to be roughly 20% higher than the measured heat release. With some uncertainty
due to measurement and assumptions on exactly what portions of the cell is what material,
this validates the measured results. The heat of combustion from the PMMA samples
matches with the literature, validating the method and measurements.
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Taking the data from the lithium-ion cells, it was determined that placing them
between a class III and a mixed group A exposed commodity per NFPA 13 definitions can
be used for sprinkler designs. As more data and testing is available, this can be updated.
With no formal guidance, designing sprinkler systems around lithium-ion cells requires a
performance-based approach. By testing and establishing various metrics such as the heat
of combustion and the total heat released per volume for lithium-ion cells, work to improve
fire safety system design guidance has been accomplished.
5.1 Future Work
A single repository of failure events involving lithium-ion cells and Li-BESS would
benefit the safety community. With scattered reports and no clear understanding of failures
around the world, there is a lack of data to help understand and show stakeholders some
of the safety gaps and issues. With this emerging technology, it is important to realize the
unknown phenomena and address them quickly.
With the models for lower flammability limits, laminar flame speed, and maximum
overpressure, validation studies should be performed just to help understand any uncertain-
ties. Additionally, with so many different methods to compute LFL, some studies with
various mixtures of the vent gas species just to help validate some of the LFL models.
This can provide guidance on which models are appropriate based on the specific gas
composition. Additionally, specific chemistries, capacities, form factors, and failure tests
should be tested and ranked to further determine the effects of different parameters on the
vent gas compositions and overall gas production and rate. Then better design guidelines
can be established for sizing Li-BESS ventilation systems. The other concern is the fact
that during failure, the gases emitted are hot. Studies can be done to help show the effects
on flame speed, but from the theory shown in equation 3.4 as temperature increases, so
does the flame speed.
Obstructions, which cause flame speeds to increase due to turbulence effects, cause
deflagration vent sizes to increase. With NFPA 68 using the surface area rather than a
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blockage ratio or cross-sectional area that other literature uses, this needs to be investigated
and updated. Additionally, smaller scale models on a rack-level should be done to understand
the limitations of NFPA 68. Perhaps looking at deflagration vent sizing for dust collectors
can be used to further develop methods to size vents at the rack level.
For the oxygen consumption calorimeter tests, the effects of oxygen production can
be mitigated by using LFP cells. This cathode chemistry does not produce oxygen as
discussed by Doughty at al. (133). These cells can be used to understand the heat release
rate and the effect of higher states of charge. Also, the total heat released can be computed
without having to account for the oxygen produced by LCO or another cell chemistry.
Additional testing using dried cells in arrays, larger capacity cells and various chemistries,
state of charge and even different electrolytes can even further help develop and rank the
hazards while accounting for these different parameters. Perhaps a larger cell in terms of
both capacity and volume would take longer to burn. This might dampen out some of
the effects noted in the array testing and better establish times between each cell burning.
Compared to the PMMA array test, which took about 1100 seconds to completely burn
giving distinct peaks for each sample, the 500 mAh and 800 mAh arrays about 330 and 450
seconds to completely burn. Perhaps using larger cells will help prevent as much overlap
in terms of burning and help paint a clearer picture of how the arrays burn. From the
literature, the electrolyte heat release rate curve varying based on the mixture composition
and species. It is clear that varying and understanding the electrolyte effect is important.
More testing with lower heat flux from the conical heater might slow down the combustion
process, showing different results on how lithium-ion cell arrays burn.
Additionally, cone calorimeter testing using cells with different volume to surface area
ratios, states of charge, and cathode chemistries can help establish what specific variables
change the results the most. Collecting more data can help resolve uncertainties that were
discussed in chapter four. Array testing by configuring the cells such that the thin side of
each cell is faced up can help determine how the fire characteristics change and how each
cell fails. Also, dried cells need to be further investigated. As mentioned in chapter four,
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the dried 800 mAh cells had a smaller overall heat of combustion than the 500 mAh cells.
This is hypothesized to be due to the electrolyte in the 800 mAh dried cells to have not
completely evaporated.
Overall, studies and analysis provided in this thesis help provide methodologies
that can help increase the safety and understanding of Li-BESS. As more data is collected
and analyzed, proactive updates to codes and standards can help the safety community





NFPA 68 Deflagration Calculator
#NFPA 68 Gas Deflagration Vent Calculator
#Disclamer- Use of this code is solely the responsibility of the user
import cantera as ct
import math
#User input function






#Unburned Gas-Air Mixture Speed of Sound (m/s):
def equilSoundSpeeds(gas, rtol=1.0e-6, maxiter=5000):






# Perturb the pressure
p1 = p0*1.0001
# Set the gas to a state with the same entropy and composition but
# The perturbed pressure
gas.SP = s0, p1
# Now equilibrate the gas holding S and P constant
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gas.equilibrate('SP', rtol=rtol, maxiter=maxiter)
# Equilibrium sound speed
aequil = math.sqrt((p1 - p0)/(gas.density - r0))
return aequil,
gas = ct.Solution('gri30.xml','gri30_mix')
# Calls Gas Properties from Gri-MECH
carbon = ct.Solution('graphite.xml')
mix_phases = [(gas, 1.0),(carbon, 0.0)] # Burned Mixture
gas.set_equivalence_ratio(phi, 'H2:1', 'O2:1,N2:3.76')
T = 300.0
gas.TP = T, ct.one_atm
#Unburned gas-air mixture speed of sound (m/s):
au = equilSoundSpeeds(gas)[0]
#Ratio of Specific Heats for Burned gas-air mixture
gas_b = ct.Solution('gri30.xml','gri30_mix')
#Calls Gas Properties from Gri-MECH
carbon = ct.Solution('graphite.xml')
mix_phases_b = [(gas_b, 1.0),(carbon, 0.0)]
#Burned Mixture
Pi = 101000 #Initial pressure Pa
Ti = 300 #Initial unburned gas temperature K
gas_b.TP = Ti,Pi
gas_b.set_equivalence_ratio(phi, 'H2:1', 'O2:1.0, N2:3.76')
#Mass Density of Unburned Gas-Air Mixture (kg/m^3):
rho_u = gas_b.density
#Unburned gas-air mixture dynamic viscosity (kg/m-s):
mu_u = gas_b.viscosity
#Suppress the next two lines for unburned data
burned = ct.Mixture(mix_phases_b)
#Equilibrate the mixture adiabatically at constant P
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burned.equilibrate('HP', solver='gibbs', max_steps=1000)
gamma_b = gas_b.cp/gas_b.cv #Suppress for unburned data














As = 2*Aw1 + 2*Aw2 + Aw3




#Static activation pressure of the venting device (bar-g):
Pstat = 0.1
#Unburned Gas-Air Mixture Sonic Flow Mass Flux(kg/m^2-s)
Gu = 230.1
#Vent flow discharge coefficient







#Vent diameter: Needs to be iterated based off of
#Assumed number of vents and vent area
#Initial assumption 10 vents with a total area of 90% of wall
def ventarea(Av1):
Dv = math.sqrt((Av1/Vent_Number))
#Reynolds number of flame through structure:
Re_flame = rho_u*Su*(0.5*Dhe)/mu_u
#Phi 1: Based on Reynolds Number of Flame Front:
phi_1 = max(1, (Re_flame/4000)**0.39)
#Maximum Velocity through Vent (m/s):
uv = min(math.sqrt(Pred*2*10**5/rho_u),au)
#Reynolds number through vent
Re_vent = 0.5*rho_u*uv*Dv/mu_u
#Phi 2: Based on Reynolds Number through Vent:
beta1 = 1.23
beta2 = 2.37*10**-3
phi_2 = max(1, beta1*(Re_vent/10**6)**((beta2/Su)**0.5))
#Lambda 0:
Lambda_0=phi_1*phi_2
#Lambda 1 Based on Obstructed surface area (m^2):
Aobs = 0.1*As
#Obstruction Correction Factor
if Aobs < 0.2*As:
Lambda_1=Lambda_0






if L_D < 2.5:
Lambda = Lambda_1
elif L_D >= 2.5:
Lambda = Lambda_1*(1+((L_D/2.5)-1)**2)
#L/D Correction Factor
if L_D > 5:
print ("L/D Above 5 see NFPA 68 Chapter 9")
elif Pmax > 10:
print ("Pmax Above 10 bar-g see NFPA 68")






if Pred <= 0.5:
Avo = As*C/math.sqrt(Pred)

















print("Vent Size Required", Avo, "m^2")
print("Available Surface Area", As, "m^2")
if Avo > 0.5*As:
print("Warning: Vent Size Exceeds Available Surface Area")
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Appendix B
Additional Lithium-Ion Battery Cone Calorimeter Images
The intent of Appendix B is to give additional images and photos of the cone
calorimeter testing.
Figure B.1: Single 800 mAh Cell Smaller Jet
Figure B.1 above shows a smaller effect from a single 800 mAh cell jetting. Only a
few pictures were captured of this effect due to how difficult it is to see at other angles.
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Figure B.2: Single 500 mAh Cell Smaller Jet
Figure B.2 above shows a smaller effect from a single 500 mAh cell jetting. With the
500 mAh cell being smaller in size, rather than ejecting off the side of the sample holder,
the jetting is more captured in the exhaust stream and pulled straight up.
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Figure B.3: 500 mAh Array Burning with Small Jet Effect
Figure B.3 shows the jetting effect from the 500 mAh array test. There are two
distinct flames, with the top of the cell burning along with the jetting coming from the
tabbed area that is facing away from the sample holder handle.
176
Figure B.4: Post Burn of 500 mAh Array in Modified Sample Holder
Figure B.4 shows another example of the 500 mAh array test after completely
burning and bring removed from the cone calorimeter.
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Figure B.5: Jetting of 800 mAh Array
Like the 500 mAh array, figure B.5 shows the burning and jetting effects for the 800
mAh array. The flame is more of a jet and the differences can be noted below.
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Figure B.6: Burning of 800 mAh Array Post Jetting Effect
Figure B.6 shows the 800 mAh array burning after the jetting effect is gone. Comparing
with figure B.5, the flames are a lot different in terms of color and shape.
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Appendix C
Heat Release Rate per Nominal kWh
The intent of Appendix C is to show another to quantify the cone calorimeter tests
by using the nominal energy for each cell. Table 4.2 gives a nominal energy of 1.85 Wh for
the 500 mAh cell and 2.96 Wh for the 800 mAh cell. The five cell arrays have a nominal
energy of 9.25 Wh for the 500 mAh array and 14.8 Wh for the 800 mAh array.







Test 1 322.73 212.31 22.51
Test 2 419.75 221.80 25.95
Test 3 520.67 242.76 26.70
Mean 421.05 225.62 25.05
Std. Dev. 98.98 15.58 2.24
Uncertainty (±) 245.89 38.71 5.56
The single cell data gives a total heat released average of 25.05 MJ/kWh per table
C.1.







Test 1 300.16 163.79 22.28
Test 2 387.84 171.99 23.56
Test 3 529.51 228.31 23.29
Mean 405.84 188.03 23.04
Std. Dev. 115.73 35.12 0.68
Uncertainty (±) 287.50 87.26 1.68
Compared with the 500 mAh single cell, table C.2 gives the overall total heat released
of 23.04 MJ/kWh on average, slightly lower than that of the 500 mAh single cell.
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Test 1 130.78 67.90 27.09
Test 2 145.23 83.55 26.65
Test 3 158.62 91.83 28.28
Mean 144.88 81.09 27.34
Std. Dev. 13.93 12.16 0.84
Uncertainty (±) 34.60 30.20 2.10
The single cell data gives a total heat released average of 27.34 MJ/kWh per table
C.3. This is even slightly higher than that of the single cell tests.







Test 1 121.03 57.99 24.24
Test 2 81.99 44.83 24.12
Test 3 107.47 57.64 21.79
Mean 103.49 53.49 23.38
Std. Dev. 19.82 7.50 1.38
Uncertainty (±) 49.24 18.64 3.43
Table C.4 gives the 800 mAh array test data per kWh. Compared with the 500 mAh
array, the 800 mAh as an overall total heat released of 23.38 MJ/kWh on average, slightly
lower than that of the 500 mAh single cell and very similar to the single cell data.
A couple of ways this data can be used is by comparing with other literature and
further helping understand the MAQ value of 600 kWh value from NFPA 1 Ch. 52.
The 0% SOC array test by Larsson et al. (122) using five LFP cells gives a total
heat release of 8.314 MJ. With 5 cells at nominally 22.4 Wh each, this gives a total heat
release per kWh of 74.23 MJ/kWh. This is about three times the values from the 500 mAh
and 800 mAh tests. The effect from other electrolytes might need to be investigated and
how the characteristics change at different states of charge.
Additionally, the maximum allowable quantity per NFPA 1 Ch. 52 is 600 kWh which
effects the required documentation or requirements per NFPA 101. From the test data, the
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total heat released for a 600-kWh system would be 13824 MJ to 16404 MJ. The total heat
release from the test by Larsson would be 44538 MJ. This is drastically different and how
this value was obtained should be further investigated and understood with these types of
tests.
According to Hua et al. (134) the gravimetric energy density (Wh/kg) of the LFP
cell is about 40% of the LCO cell. The volumetric energy density (Wh/L) of the LFP cell is
about 35% of the LCO cell. In comparing the array test data with the data from Larsson,
the total heat released per kWh for the LCO cell is about 32% compared with the LFP
cell. So, the energy density for the LFP cell is a bit more than one-third of the energy
density, yet the total heat released per kWh is about three times that of the LCO cell.
If the energy density is inverted and the heat of combustion is assumed to be about the
same, this actually matches up with measured total heat release per kWh in terms of the
difference of the LCO and LFP cells.
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